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ABSTRACT 
 
Gays identity is usually cast in generics—statements about an indeterminate 
number of members in a given category. Sometimes these generic statements 
often get built up into folk definitions, vague and imprecise ways to talk about 
objects. Other times generics get co-opted into authentic definitions, definitions 
that pick out a few traits and assert that real members of the class have these traits 
and members that do not are simply members by a technicality. I assess how we 
adopt these generic traits into our language and what are the ramifications of 
using generic traits as a social identity. I analyze the use of authentic definitions 
in Queer Theory, particularly Michael Warner’s use of authentic traits to define a 
normative Queer identity. I do not just simply focus on what are the effects, but 
how these folk or authentic definitions gain currency and, furthermore, how can 
they be changed. I conclude with an analytic account of what it means to be gay 
and argue that such an account will undercut many of the problems associated 
with folk or authentic definitions about being gay.  
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Logical Generics and Gay Identity 
 What does it mean to be gay? This question seems obvious but answering it 
is actually presupposed by any other question about gay politics. Questions of 
marriage, legal benefits, employment rights, medical decisions, economic 
treatment, and even social legitimacy all rest squarely on the definition of what it 
means to be gay. Usually identifying who qualifies as gay has been defined by 
logical generics, traits that are commonly associated with the term “gay,” but have 
little to do with the actual definition. These social definitions serve as a strong 
starting ground for how gays are talked about in terms of social, political, and 
economic agency. Gays cannot marry because they are promiscuous. Gays cannot 
work near children because they are sexual predators. Gays cannot live together 
because they do not know how to be committed to each other. Here I propose a new 
way of talking about gay identity. My proposal is a thin analytic definition of being 
gay that does not give any of these objections room to stand and so the result is a 
clear path to social, economic, and political agency for gays. To be gay is to 
sexually desire someone only of the same sex.  
 I will begin by simply describing how the term “gay” is used. Sociologist 
C.J. Pascoe documents in Dude, You’re a Fag that “fag discourse” (70-82) largely 
informs, and is largely informed by, a descriptive account of how “gay” is 
identified.
1
 Because fag discourse is, as Pascoe notes, purely a pejorative 
                                               
1 Pascoe describes fag discourse as a game of verbal one upsmanship between people, usually 
adolescent males. The epithet “fag” is used to describe any undesirable behavior, though it usually 
coincides with effeminate behavior that would typically identify someone as gay. 
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enterprise, it does not really concern itself with identifying members of the social 
kind gay. Thus, I will try to limit myself to a more detached examination of how 
description works. Gays are described, by and large, by either folk definitions or 
authentic definitions. Both of these proposed definitions are not actual definitions, 
insofar as they lack a kind of logical rigor, but are instead constituted by logical 
generics. Logical generics are statements about members, though not all members, 
of a certain population. Folk definitions are built up by a collection of logical 
generic statements and act as a way to try and identify gays in ordinary language. 
Folk definitions are, by their very use, vague and imprecise, but retain a strong 
social and political currency. Authentic definitions, often proposed by Queer 
Theorists, are also made up of a collection of logical generic statements, but instead 
of simply picking out members who have those traits, authentic definitions try and 
apply a normative force to coerce members who might identify or be identified as 
gay into adopting the specific traits picked out in the authentic definition. Members 
who do qualify as gay, but do not qualify as authentically gay, are seen as technical 
or boring members.  
 This social description is largely based on certain social traits or markers 
for easy identification; these markers are used by friends and foes of the gay 
community alike. By using these external markers, I will develop an account of 
how logical generics structure this identifying process. This section is important 
because it sets up not only what generics are, but how they are used. Ultimately, 
generics act as a sort of folk definition in ordinary language. Far from being some 
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innocuous utterance in ordinary language that we can ignore, folk definitions are 
the basic building blocks that we construct more rigorous and precise terminology 
out of. Understanding generics and these folk definitions is important because 
before we know where we are going, we must first know where we are.  
 In the second section I will provide a brief historical account of how the 
word “homosexual” gained currency. The historiographical emergence of the word 
marked a specific change not only in language, but also conception. The word 
documented not simply a sex act, but an entire interior psychology. This interior 
psychology was marked by attitudes, behavior, and desires. Unlike sodomites, 
homosexuals could now be identified through non-sexual markers. These markers 
stood in place of the sex act and gained the forbiddeness of the identity which they 
marked. The importance of this transfer, from act to identity, is that the identity 
could support more traits for recognition. The sodomite, by definition, could only 
be identified by one act, and one act only. Homosexuals, because of this 
convergence of discourse, could be identified by numerous other and, more 
interestingly enough, non-sexual traits. Additionally, the serious overtones of what 
the homosexual was—a deviant, a criminal, a predator—required that society be 
aware of these traits; to see these traits was, in a way, to see the homosexual. 
 In the third section I will turn to an account of normative or linguistic 
construction of what amounts to an authentic identity. This section will examine the 
work of Michael Warner and Leo Bersani. Both men argue against the negative 
stereotypes associated with the gay or Queer community, but argue that these traits 
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are not stigmas, but rather opportunities to expand social acceptance and 
legitimacy. In framing Queers as the real or exemplary gays, Warner smuggles 
authenticity in as an actual definition of what being gay means. I will argue that 
Warner’s Queer/gay distinction is not simply a linguistic distinction, but functions 
as a part of a larger political project. The intimate connection between language and 
politics reflects that language is not just what we talk about, but what we want to 
talk about.   
 The last section will put forward and defend my definition. Additionally, I 
will look at some of the advantages of my position in relation to authentic 
definitions or folk definitions. Both of these definitions, I will argue, have a kind of 
normative force to them; folk definitions have a much weaker and more prudential 
kind of force. My argument will be that when we define gays in terms of same-sex 
desire, the arguments put forward against gay rights no longer have room to stand: 
gays are promiscuous not only misidentifies, but also misdefines what it is trying to 
talk about. In a similar way, an analytic definition undercuts the other authentic and 
folk definitions.   
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1 Generics 
 Logical generics are a curious logical structure. In “Generics: Cognition and 
Acquisition” Sarah-Jane Leslie states that “generics express generalizations. This is 
intended as a weak and untendentious claim; generic sentences are not about some 
specific instances of the category…but rather about the category in general” (21). 
In terms of how we form categories, logical generics are “a very powerful 
mechanism for induction; [they] draw robust inferences from very few examples 
(31). Additionally, they seem to be how people first acquire concepts and 
understanding of groups (2 & 21-28). Logical generics occupy an odd middle 
ground between universal and existential claims. “That ‘tigers have stripes’ is true 
might not seem particularly troubling; even if some tigers lack stripes, most tigers 
sport them” (1). When we say “tigers are striped” we do not mean that all tigers are 
striped or even that one tiger is striped, but, rather, that generically or 
stereotypically speaking, tigers are striped.  
We might be tempted to say that the truth value of something that is 
generically true is only a matter of numbers, but there are several generics that 
seem to suggest, according to Leslie, that it is not the case that a majority is 
required for a generic to be true. “Examples such as ‘birds lay eggs’, though, 
indicate that it is not necessary for the truth of these sentences that the majority of 
the kind in question satisfy the predicate; most birds do not lay eggs, yet ‘birds lay 
eggs’ is true” (Leslie 1)—roughly half of birds are male and don’t lay eggs. 
Additionally, some female birds might not mate, or be sterile, or otherwise not lay 
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eggs. Thus, “birds lay eggs” is not true purely by numbers. We might, however, 
take Leslie’s example and say that “birds lay eggs” is a vague way of talking about 
how the species reproduces. So in reality, when people say “birds lay eggs”, they 
really mean “birds are the kind of species that reproduce by laying eggs”. The 
reference here is about the category, not each individual member. This example is 
important because it demonstrates how generic statements might be poorly phrased 
and not actually reference what they seem to be referencing at a first glance. This 
vagueness does not mean that logical generics are flawed, but rather that they are a 
product of ordinary language which is notoriously messy and vague. 
What do we make of generics that are used as if they were true in spite of 
the numbers? Leslie renders these generics, like “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile 
Virus”, as true, even though less than 1% of mosquitoes actually carry the disease 
(Leslie 1-2). I may go my whole life without ever encountering a Mosquito with the 
West Nile Virus, yet still believe “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile Virus” is true. 
Because generics are based on induction, all that needs to occur is for me to 
encounter a West Nile mosquito or even hear of a report that a mosquito is carrying 
the West Nile Virus. I might find the report so scary that it acts as a kind of default 
for all my other experiences with the uninfected mosquitoes. I think Leslie is right 
in her account that the generic sentence about mosquitoes is treated as true, but I 
think we need to make some further qualification. Treating a sentence as true is not 
the same as the sentence being true. The sentence “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile 
Virus” is treated, or believed, to be generically true, but this truth value is attributed 
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to the sentence despite the fact that it is empirically, or actually false. On Leslie’s 
account, here at least, I am not aware of this distinction. Though Sally Haslanger 
begins to apply this distinction later on to Leslie’s categories of generics in 
“Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground”, the distinction between a generic 
believed to be true and a generic being true, is not made. This distinction is 
sometimes hard to draw, but I think making it will help us get clear on how 
generics are used in discussing social kinds in ordinary language.  
Other generics that are believed to be true in spite of the numbers are: 
“‘Sharks attack bathers,’ ‘tigers eat people,’ and ‘Rottweiler’s maul children’” 
(Leslie 14). Leslie’s reasoning for why these are true despite the numbers is that  
In all of them, the sentence attributes harmful, dangerous, or appalling 
properties to the kind. More generally, if the property in question is the sort 
of property of which one would be well served to be forewarned, even if 
there were only a small chance of encountering it, then generic attributions 
of the property are intuitively true. We see a similar phenomenon elsewhere 
in our judgments: compare the number and regularity of times one must 
worry to be a worrier versus the number of murders one must commit to be 
a murderer (Leslie 15). 
Here again Leslie seems to be saying that these foreboding generics are true, 
without qualification that they may be believed to be true while actually being 
false. On my account generics are true generics if they accurately describe an 
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overwhelming number of members in the population. “Tigers are striped” is a true 
generic because it accurately describes an overwhelming number of tigers. 
Sometimes, however, we may adopt generics that language users believe are true, 
even though the generics to not accurately describe what members of the given 
population are like. There may be various reasons for why, even in the face of 
contrary evidence, that generics believed to be true, though actually false, retain 
currency. One might be that a majority of language users believe the generic to be 
true and use the generic in ordinary language. The generic is accepted as if it were 
true. Yet this perseverance can be adequately explained, I think if we make a 
further distinction between the kinds of generics.  
There are two relevant generics in this discussion: foreboding generics or 
essential generics.
2
 The first two examples we talked about, “tigers have stripes” or 
“birds lay eggs”, describe traits we deem important or essential to the identity of 
tigers and birds. Certainly there are instances where some members lack one of the 
essential properties, sterile or male birds or albino tigers, but the generic statement 
remains relatively unaffected by the absence of this trait. Leslie cites Nisbett and 
Ross’ work that “argued[d] that people are affected by information in proportion to 
the vividness and concreteness of that information and note that this predicts that 
the absence of an event or property should have disproportionately little impact, in 
                                               
2 Sarah-Jane Leslie makes other distinctions with generics (“Generics: Cognition and Acquisition” 
and “Generics and the Structure of the Mind”), which are more sophisticated and fruitful, but not 
directly relevant here. Sally Haslanger, taking cues from Leslie, also develops a different 
classification of generics in “Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground”. I recognize that my 
account here is woefully inadequate to offer a competing classification, but I believe it is sufficient 
for the application of generics I am attempting here. I am considering this work more of an 
application of generics, so my scope and analysis will fall far short of Leslie and Haslanger.  
  
9 
 
virtue of such information being more easily overlooked” (36). We tend to 
overlook the examples where a member did not have an essential trait because, 
according to Leslie, we use generics to try and find a good way of predicting future 
encounters. Thus, essential generics name properties or traits in something that are 
good ways of identifying future examples.  
I find Leslie’s predictive account to be somewhat problematic. Leslie gave 
several examples of generics that are true, in spite of numbers of cases confirming 
them, because the generic identified a trait we would be good to be “forewarned” 
(15). Let’s call these generics “foreboding generics”. She gives the example of 
“sharks attack bathers” or “tigers are ferocious” and says that we believe these 
generics to be true because they tell us about a trait that we should be cautious of. 
Let’s look at the example “mosquitoes carry the West Nile Virus”. This generic 
tells us about a trait we should be forewarned about, and we count it to be true, 
even though less than 1% of mosquitoes are actually infected with West Nile. 
Leslie reasons that the trait of carrying the West Nile Virus is true of mosquitoes 
because they potentially carry it and it is better to be safe than sorry. She contrasts 
the mosquito example with “accountants are murders” and says that “we also don’t 
decide that ‘accountants are murders’ is true even though some accountants have 
been known to kill” we “look for a good predictor of the property in question; it 
avoids generalizing to overly broad kinds to irrelevant kinds” (Leslie 41). But why 
do we say that “accountants are murderers” is false? Certainly accountants can be 
murderers and it is a very safe practice to avoid murderers. If the chances of finding 
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a murdering accountant is statistically equitable to the infected mosquito, then why 
do we not, on Leslie’s account, believe that “accountants are murderers” is true? I 
believe that we can retain Leslie’s observation, that generics are used as good 
predictors only when we are talking about essential traits, or traits that appear in an 
overwhelmingly large number of the population. We cannot retain the idea that 
generics are good predictors when we only consider foreboding generics. 
So what makes a generic based around fear believed to be true? To clarify, 
while all foreboding generics are false, in terms that they do not accurately describe 
the world, they retain use in a respective language community because they are 
believed to be true. I believe this perseveration occurs for two reasons: (1) fear of 
interacting with the group in question and (2) that the group of language users in 
question believes that the foreboding trait is part of the nature of the generic. Either 
condition can enable a generic to be used, but if the generic is based purely on fear, 
then it seems that the generic fades in and out of use. Social kinds are a little more 
complex, but if the generic is based purely on fear, and not on the belief that the 
generic represents an intrinsic part of the kind’s identity, then the generic fades 
when things settle down. “Japanese-Americans cannot be trusted” was a generic in 
the United States during World War II. The generic was accepted by the language 
users because they were afraid of more Japanese-Americans sharing secrets or 
enabling another attack on American troops. This generic was so strong that it 
functioned as if it were a definition for the social kind “Japanese-American,” and 
lead to internment camps. But when the war was over and the fearful atmosphere 
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dissipated, the generic “Japanese-Americans are treacherous” largely faded not 
only from discourse, but from belief.  
In many cases, I believe that foreboding generics blend together with 
essential generics. Because we mix these two kinds together we are able to use 
foreboding generics as good predictors of a future encounter because they are 
coupled together with essential generics. Traits that are extremely poor ways to 
identify members are mixed in with traits that are good ways of identifying 
members. When we talk about foreboding generics, we do so already with a 
backdrop of the essential generics. So we use the essential generics to be a good 
predictor of what we are supposed to see, and then we use the foreboding generic to 
know that what we have identified is to be avoided.
3
 If foreboding generics stood 
on their own, we would, as Leslie points out, only really be able to identify traits 
that occur in 1% or so in a population. Take a step back for a moment: the generic 
about mosquitoes or sharks identify a trait that will be found in less than 1% of the 
population. In no other instance would we accept something that unreliable as a 
“good predictor”. So why do we attribute the trait of disease to the mosquito?  
Leslie makes a nice point that the extremeness of an experience can override other 
mundane instances with the same subject in question: “if by default, we are 
                                               
3 A case of food poisoning, for instance, will usually have a person swear off a restaurant or specific 
food, even though there have been many other instances where the food was fine. So the generic 
conception of food at that restaurant prior to the foreboding trait of illness inducing was simply that 
it was tasty, edible, etc. But after the foreboding instance happened, the generic conception 
accumulated the foreboding trait into the new essential conception. The generic, however, is mainly 
relative to the language user who got sick. His testimony might be persuasive enough to convince 
other people to adopt that generic conception of the restaurant (he might be a food critic), but by and 
large I suspect that if we have not interacted, immediately or through testimony, with the foreboding 
trait, we will not accept it as saying something accurate. 
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disposed to generalize striking information more readily than nonstriking 
information, then we would predict that in high-demand situations we might make 
overly high statistical generalizations concerning striking information” (42). So if 
we feel panic, fear, or pain in a certain situation, we might, just by the nature of 
induction, let that experience influence all our other experiences with that same 
subject or object. “The more striking appalling, or otherwise gripping we find the 
property in the generic, the more tolerant the generic is to exceptions” (Leslie 15).  
But what about other foreboding generics about social kinds? “Blacks are 
criminals” is a generic based on fear and is believed to be true by many language 
users. An interesting empirical question might be how many language users are 
required to consent to a statement before it is believed to be a “true” generic, but a 
problem with this inquiry might be public and private assent. This ability to conceal 
public detection would make any empirical verification difficult. Some people 
might be wary of expressing their assent to “blacks are criminals” in public, but 
might not be hesitant in private. In either context, however, they believe it, so at 
what stage does the assent, implicit or explicit, reach critical mass for a given 
generic to gain currency? “Blacks are criminals” lingers in American discourse 
largely because, I suspect, many language users still believe, privately or 
publically, that the generic attributes something essential to black identity.
4
 So the 
                                               
4 Andrew Hacker, specifically in Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal argues 
that not only do Whites in the U.S. tend to believe this conceptions of Blacks, but also that Blacks 
are aware of how Whites perceive them. Additionally, race theorist Frantz Fanon makes this same 
point, that Whites imagine Blacks to be deviant, though not just legally, and that Blacks are aware 
of this White perception. Both men explore the ramifications for how Blacks form Black identity in 
response to this White gaze.  
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generic “blacks are criminals” is based not only on fear, but also on the entrenched 
view that to be black means to break the law. The number of language users 
simply, however, determines whether or not a generic exists or is used, the number 
of language users does not determine the truth value of the generic. We might 
mistake the fact that because a lot of people use the generic that it must be true, but 
as the generics involving categorization of social groups show, the number of 
language users using the generic is irrelevant to the truth value of the generic.  
Blending foreboding generics with essential generics is somewhat context 
sensitive. In areas where there are more frequent cases of infection, “mosquitoes 
carry the West Nile Virus” might be more intimately joined to the other essential 
generics about mosquitoes: “mosquitoes fly”, “mosquitoes are small”, etc. In places 
where infection rates are low, say Midwest America, the foreboding generic might 
only be relevant when infection rates spike. Without the context of increased 
infection rates to induce fear in people, the Midwest generic conception of 
mosquitoes might simply be “mosquitoes fly”, “mosquitoes are small”, or 
“mosquitoes are annoying”. Sometimes, however  it may prove extremely difficult 
to separate the essential traits from the foreboding traits. “Black Widows are 
dangerous”, for instance, is deemed true even if people don’t live near Black 
Widows. While there is good evidence to talk about how and why Black Widows 
are dangerous, there is also the scientific observation that spiders are usually more 
afraid of humans than humans are of spiders. Even with this observation, we do 
not, for better or worse, give the Black Widows a fair day in court.   
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1.1 Generics and Use 
Generics are rooted in how an object is perceived; the use of the generic 
may be based more on belief rather than fact.  Many times the belief of language 
users corresponds to reality: tigers have stripes, grass is green, trees have leaves, 
etc. Sometimes, however, and especially with foreboding generics the generic says 
something factually false about what it is describing. If the trait in question is 
foreboding enough, the generic will be resistant, if not immune to, revision. Take 
the generic “sharks attack bathers”—even though we are told by the marine 
biologist that they are quite docile and kill less people a year than bee stings the 
generic retains currency. Even if we heard the biologists’ evidence every day for a 
very long time, I do not think our generic conception of sharks would actually 
change. Perhaps, on land or in the aquarium, we would say that it changed, but we 
would most likely revert back to the old generic when we see a dorsal fin in open 
water. I believe this perseveration occurs because the foreboding generic has fused 
with the essential generic of what it means to be a shark.
5
  
                                               
5 We might be tempted to say that it is not an essential property of sharks to maul people, but rather 
that when someone is mauled at the beach it is done by a shark and not a starfish. Ariel Cohen’s 
account of absolute (the trait in question is present in over 50% of the population) and relative (the 
trait is more likely in a specific population among other similar populations) generics explores this 
possibility. The generic “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile Virus” is true on this account as a relative 
generic—“mosquitoes are far more likely than other insects to carry the virus” (Leslie 10). But 
Leslie states that “Cohen gives us no procedure to determine whether a generic is absolute or 
relative” and goes on to give counterexamples of generics that are false, but would be true under 
Cohen’s account. “‘Books are paperbacks,’ ‘Chickens are female,’ ‘bees are sterile,’ ‘dogs have 
three legs’. These are all intuitively false, but are rendered true by Cohen’s account—the first three 
being absolute generics, the fourth being a true relative generic since a three-legged animal is very 
likely to be a dog” (Leslie 10-11). 
  
15 
 
Generics based on fear are not formed by a rigorous examination of 
language, but on either experience or warnings. Because these generics are formed 
on fear, reasoning will be met with resistance precisely because it is treating what is 
a structurally irrational belief as a rational belief. Foreboding generics are insulated 
by the fear they are believed to represent. Sometimes we can use reason to explain 
to people who are afraid why they shouldn’t be, but sometimes not. There is no 
exact approach as to how to change a generic if it represents a fear that the 
language user believes to be an essential property of the thing in question. So long 
as language users believe that the traits identified are what the thing is, they will 
continue to use the generic, regardless of its actual truth value. Thus, rational 
arguments will simply be talking past what is really the issue. If the generics are 
rooted in experiences, then only other experiences can change them. Sometimes 
this change may occur with a few vivid experiences, other times this change might 
be slow, and sometimes, change might never happen. Yet if there is going to be any 
attempt at all to engage, we should be aware of what will be more likely to be 
effective and what will be less likely to be effective.  
Fear is not the only barrier to changing a generic—tradition and authority 
also may play a role. We may develop generics about things we have never 
experienced, but nevertheless believe a person whom we believe is trustworthy or 
in a better position to know. Additionally, we may develop some kind of custom 
with the generic; the longer we keep it, the more natural we take the generic to be. 
To challenge the generic, then, is not only to challenge  what we deem essential to 
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the concept of a thing, nor is it to only call into question the potential threat level of 
a thing, but it is also to call into question the authority of who told us and the 
customs we developed with the generic. Thus, challenging the authority or validity 
of a generic is not an innocuous linguistic analysis, but a serious psychological 
challenge to the speaker’s conception. Challenge her beliefs and you challenge 
those who told her the belief was true. The adoption and retention of some generics 
may be less about facts and more about belief.  
What happens when two language users have different generics about the 
same thing? Because logical generics are created by induction, the truth value of a 
statement might be dependent upon experiences. Leslie denies that this relativist 
objection poses a problem because “‘Tigers are striped’ cannot be understood as 
expressing a universal claim to the effect that all tigers have stripes; it is 
compatible with the existence of stripeless albino tigers in the way that the 
universal claim is not” (Semantics Leslie). But what if the only tigers someone has 
seen are albino tigers? Inductively, then, she will say that “tigers are not striped” 
and seem to have solid evidence to say so; all of her experiences speak for the 
claim, and none of them against it. So what do we do when we run into conflicting 
generics? David Hume, in his section on miracles in An Enquiry of Human Nature, 
gives an example of an Indian prince who has never seen water freeze (172-73). 
The prince does not believe accounts that water can turn into a solid at given 
temperatures because all of his experiences contradict the claim. Yet Hume is in a 
better epistemological position than the prince, for he knows that water will turn 
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into a solid at a given temperature. The prince, therefore, is wrong, but not in some 
blameworthy way, just insofar as he is saying something false. In the same way, the 
person who grew up with only the experiences of albino tigers is wrong insofar as 
she is saying something false about the general nature of tigers, not that she is 
blameworthy in any sense.
6
  
There are some instances, however, where the tension between two generics 
is not easily resolved. The ordinary conception of sharks being vicious killers is 
likely fostered by Hollywood movies or sensationalized news stories. People who 
study sharks and work in aquariums or zoos, however, have more experience with 
sharks and in fact are better informed about just what sharks do and don’t do than 
the average person who believes “sharks attack bathers.” The generic relative to the 
scientific community might be that “sharks are docile.” Clearly both generics 
cannot be right because they contradict each other, but how do we resolve the 
discrepancy? Certainly scientists or nature shows might try to educate people on 
the relatively low risk nature of sharks, but most likely the next time those very 
people in question encounter a shark they will revert back to the old generic that 
“sharks attack bathers.” This conflict between the two generics seems relatively 
harmless; for the most part sharks do not really care about their reputation in the 
human world. 
                                               
6 Typically, generics are resistant to change. Yet Hume’s example is a curious counter point: 
suppose the prince moves to England and sees water freeze every winter. Will his generic about 
water change as well? He might make the distinction and say that “water is liquid” and “ice is solid” 
and try to preserve the original generic by simply distinguishing between liquid and solid water, but 
I suspect that he would have to revise his beliefs. Moving the prince to England might show that 
generics are not absolutely immune to revision.  
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1.12 Generics as Folk Definitions  
Often times the collection of generic traits acts as a convenient social way 
of defining an object. “Tigers are striped”, “tigers are ferocious”, “tigers have four 
legs”, etc. all give us a good way to talk about what tigers are, but they do not 
really provide a definition for what a tiger is. Yet all of these generics are bundled 
together when we say the word “tiger” in ordinary language. So a folk definition is 
the collection of generics. Because they are simply a bundling of terms, folk 
definitions are not definitions in the logical sense; they do not stretch across all 
possible worlds, but they do carry significant weight in this actual world. Folk 
definitions act as imprecise, easy, and accessible way of talking about objects. 
While these folk definitions are by no means precise or exhaustive, they, in 
ordinary language, act as if they were definitions. In contrast, there are also logical 
definitions of things. Logical definitions are simply a full account of what a thing is 
in all possible worlds. These definitions might be extremely technical, like a 
zoologist’s definition of tiger, or extremely ordinary, like “bachelor” and 
“unmarried male”. Folk definitions cannot be dismissed as a matter of prejudice or 
ignorance; we use these folk definitions all the time to get by in daily activities. 
Where else could philosophers draw their more refined definitions if not from these 
folk definitions? Philosophers cannot, therefore, pretend that they are above these 
folk definitions. In recognizing the origin of a more rigorous definition as 
beginning in the folk definition, we are in a better position to challenge and 
critically engage not just a problem of language, but how language is used.  
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Folk definitions are not just used by uneducated people; they often slip into serious 
political, legal, philosophical, medical, or social discourse. This transition, from 
folk to actual definition is problematic when the question of rights is being decided 
on. One such problem is when folk definitions—treated as actual definitions in 
ordinary language—take on the authority of a total and finalized definition. This 
problem is not how we write the dictionary, but how we practice and use language. 
The problem of using folk definitions as actual definitions is very serious: 
legislators write laws based on folk definitions, doctors identify disorders because 
of these folk definitions, and societies criminalize identities because of these folk 
definitions. A very practical use to philosophy is blunting the very natural move 
from folk definition to actual definition. Philosophers must resist the temptation to 
simply say that people are using the wrong definition and that the rest of the 
argument is flawed. This dismissal, after wiping our hands clean, does not really 
resolve any problem. Certainly it may make us feel better about ourselves that we 
applied rigor where others did not, but that is not helpful. Insofar as philosophy is a 
problem solving enterprise, it must try to understand where these “false” definitions 
come from and how to best engage them. Leslie notes that our default setting for 
logical structure seems to be in terms of generics rather than universal or existential 
quantifiers. Insofar as logical generics seem to be a default setting for how we 
understand things in the world, we might have to take a different approach in terms 
of how we engage beliefs. This development suggests that generics might be 
inescapable (Leslie 2-5). This inevitability is not a bad thing ipso facto, but it is 
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when the generic covers up an actual definition and is treated as a definition as 
opposed to an indicator. Additionally, knowing that generics develop early in life is 
perhaps the most useful tool in investigating changed social conceptions. Instead of 
lecturing the conservative who believes the pejorative generic and provocatively 
asking “how could you ever think that?”, generics offer us a new and more 
productive way of talking with people who hold different beliefs.  
1.2 Changing Generics 
Realizing a lot of negative generics beliefs don’t come from serious 
reflection and analysis of argumentation, but from experiences can lay the 
groundwork for future dialogue. Treating beliefs based on generics as if they were 
based on rigorous philosophical reflection is unproductive because it mistakes the 
source of belief. By misidentifying the source of belief—reflection instead of 
experience—in a discussion we might only entrench the belief we are trying to 
change; a full confrontation, public or private, might embarrass or humiliate the 
person. The moral, I believe, is that we must provide a way to save face, even if 
this opportunity is wildly undeserved, by avoiding argumentation and instead 
provide better experiences to supplant the generic. Another important dimension of 
dialogue would be is whether or not we view the person we are engaging with an 
intellectual equal. If we feel the person we are talking with has authority or the 
subject matter, we are more willing to listen and take their evidence seriously. I am 
not resistant when the marine biologist tells me about sharks because I view her as 
an authority on the matter. I will accept her evidence as best as I can. My resistance 
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to changing the generic about aggressive sharks is more a matter of praxis or 
survival instinct; I do not retain my generic in spite of her position because I am 
simply intellectually stubborn. On the other hand, we might not be so open to 
honest dialogue if we feel the person we are talking with is our intellectual equal or 
inferior. If he is my equal, then my experiences and thoughts are just as good as his, 
and if he is my inferior, then I don’t have to listen to him. The issue of identifying 
and conceptualizing social groups is a very charged issue. People, I imagine, are 
skeptical about experts on people of a social kind. Certainly the general public may 
accept the findings of a sociologist or a demographic study, but those do not act as 
experts on Southeast Asians. They offer statistic on people, but as outlined above, 
statistics may have little to no effect on how we form our folk definitions about 
people. Furthermore, what would it mean to say “you should listen to me, because 
I’m an expert on Black people”? It sounds, at the very least, odd. Someone might 
be an expert on Black food, Black culture, Black employment, but all of these areas 
of expertise are extremely vague: what is “Black food”? Is it food that Blacks 
make? Food that Blacks eat? Does just one Black person have to eat it, or is does 
the food in question have to be eaten by a majority of Blacks? I believe that we 
tend to reject overt authorities on issues of particular social identities because we 
have the notion that our experiences with a particular social identity is just as good 
as someone else’s experiences with the social identity.  
Simply providing one counter example or experience will not change the 
generic. If the belief is based on experience, then experience is the only kind of 
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recognized currency. Some beliefs may require more experiences than others: a 
friend may have a belief that a restaurant is awful, but I persuade him to try it one 
more time and this time we get good service. My friend’s opinion of the restaurant 
has changed. Other beliefs may require several experiences: a girl who grew up in a 
racist town with a racist family will not overturn her belief that “Blacks are 
criminals” by meeting one Black man who is not a criminal. 7 Belief perseveration 
is a challenging barrier to breach.  
One reason why generics might be difficult to change is because the 
language user believes that the generic picks out an essential property of what it is 
talking about. The racist girl may have a hard time even conceiving of someone 
who is Black who would not steal. Even meeting one Black person who is honest 
simply relegates the honest Black man as a logical possibility or some other kind of 
conceptual curiosity. The tipping point for how many honest Black men she would 
have to meet probably varies from person to person and is most likely decided by a 
multitude of other factors: when she is living, where is she living, what is her class, 
total number of experiences she has had with Blacks, etc. Thus, new experiences 
are not blank slates to build off new generics, but constantly fighting with past 
experiences to support or undermine the generic conception. Another reason why 
generics may be hard to dislodge is that they call into question too many other 
                                               
7 Some beliefs may never change no matter how many experiences there are. Veena Das, an 
anthropologist, documented in Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain that 
many women, during the partition of India and Pakistan, were abducted, raped, and assimilated into 
their rapists’ communities as family members. Most of these women adopted the belief that they 
could never be accepted back into their original communities or families. This belief persisted 
despite several overtures to get the women back to their original communities.  
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things to warrant serious revision. Suppose that the same girl believes “Blacks are 
criminals” because her family told her. To challenge her belief about Blacks then is 
to challenge not only her conception, but also the authority of her family and 
community. If we take off our philosophical hats for the moment, I would suspect 
that most of our beliefs are because someone told us—perhaps we read something 
in a book. Either way, to seriously challenge these authorities is a daunting 
epistemological task, especially if the task involves pointing out how these 
authorities messed up on something so basic as the blanket assessment of the moral 
character of an entire group of people. The inevitable next challenge is to assess 
what else was wrong.
8
   
1.3  Stereotypes  
A good way to illustrate the potential error of generics is by looking at 
stereotypes. Stereotypes are not always bad. Though usually thought of in the 
context of racism or some other form of bigotry, we rely on stereotypes for basic 
interaction with the world. Miranda Fricker in her work Epistemic Injustice argues 
that a neutral conception of stereotypes gives a pretty good account of how we 
interact with other social groups. Stereotypes are, for Fricker, “widely held 
associations between a given social group and one or more attributes” (30). This 
neutral conception of stereotypes is a good one because it enables us to talk about 
both positive and negative generalizations about groups. Additionally, Fricker 
                                               
8 Sometimes, this reluctance will not be so grandiose; the girl may just say that her community is 
just old fashioned or racist and that she could not wait to get out of the town. I suspect, however, 
that the large number of people do not challenge societal norms in this way.  
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makes the point that stereotypes may be either good or bad depending on the 
context. “The stereotype of women as intuitive is a case in point. In contexts where 
it is assumed that ‘intuitive’ suggests irrationality, the stereotype is derogatory; but 
in contexts where intuition is regarded as a cognitive asset, the stereotype is 
complimentary” (31). We collect individual examples and then abstract enough of a 
common experience so as to have an association that holds true to as many cases 
possible within the given class. The benefit of forming stereotypes, as Fricker 
argues, is that “without such a heuristic aid [the hearer] will not be able to achieve 
the normal spontaneity of credibility judgment that is characteristic of everyday 
testimonial exchange” (32). Basically Fricker’s point is that without stereotypes we 
would have to treat each encounter with someone as a totally new experience and 
could not derive basic expectations or predictions in regards to their behavior. 
Without stereotypes, we would have to doubt the credibility of any new person’s 
testimony because we would have to start from the ground up and not rely on any 
past experiences with people to give us evidence of whether or not she can give 
good testimony.  
We come to learn stereotypes not only from the lore of our fathers
9
, but also 
from our experiences. Stereotypes act as a tool to help us gather, sort, and process 
information from given people. Stereotypes, as Fricker’s account points out, are not 
always bad; they sometimes simply give us a reference point on how to approach 
an individual. Stereotypes become bad when they become unreliable ways of 
                                               
9 This epistemological position is similar to Quine’s general epistemological guidelines: simplicity 
and conservatism. 
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interacting with a population. Stereotypes become prejudicial when they influence 
or alter our observation of an individual in spite or in absence of a given trait. 
Stereotypes become bad when they block out the individual in front of us, when the 
individual is not an individual but only a manifestation of the stereotype. What 
makes the prejudicial stereotype bad is that “the association is false, the stereotype 
embodies an unreliable empirical generalization about the social group in question” 
(32). Suppose, for instance, a clerk raises his voice to an elderly customer and the 
customer gently assures the clerk that she is not hard of hearing. If the clerk 
continues to speak in a loud voice so as to follow his stereotype that the elderly are 
hard of hearing, despite the woman’s protest, he is engaging in a prejudicial 
stereotype. The clerk does not see the elderly woman in front of her, he simply sees 
an elderly customer: for him she could be any other person, and so the individual 
identity of the elderly woman is lost in the prejudice of the social kind, even though 
she is absent of the stereotype that elderly are hard of hearing. Fricker goes on to 
point out another part of prejudicial stereotypes: “prejudice is not always against 
someone or something, for there can be prejudice in favor” (35). If I insist that my 
science tutor be Asian, based on the stereotype that Asians are good in the sciences, 
despite the fact that the only Asian tutor available is terrific at language arts and 
dismal at science, then I am being prejudicial—I am staying with my stereotype in 
spite of, not because of, the evidence.  
1.31  Kinds of Harm in Stereotypes  
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A person belonging to a social kind is harmed when the stereotype or 
generic acts as the actual definition for that social kind. Recall that generics are 
rough and ready sketches and provide a good enough account of something for 
everyday purposes, but when these sketches act as the hard and fast way of 
indentifying the group, the generic oversteps its usefulness and actually 
oversimplifies. The generic informs not only outsiders to the social kind, but also 
makes those belonging to the social kind aware of how they are expected to act. 
When the use of the generic persists, in spite of an individual members’ protest, the 
individual has been harmed because the individual’s identity is no longer 
recognized; he could be replaced by any other member and the treatment would be 
the same.  
I would like to identify three kinds of harms generics or stereotypes can do: 
(1) an obvious harm of negative social or political policy (2) a harm that Fricker 
identifies in being degraded as someone who is not capable of giving adequate 
testimony and (3) the ability of people belonging to the generic group in question 
who degrade or dismiss other members who disagree. The result of this third harm 
is the person degraded does not just doubt what she knows, but also who she is and 
where she belongs. The first kind of harm is that people believe all, or enough, 
members of the stereotype have the trait in question and so legislation is passed to 
curb or discourage the negative stereotype. This harm works also with “positive” 
stereotypes; the belief that women were naturally better in the homestead led to 
several discriminatory policies and laws all around the belief that women were 
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naturally better in homemaking. An example of the second kind of harm is if a man 
states that gays are promiscuous, and an openly gay man contradicts him, points to 
himself as evidence, and the man insists that gays are promiscuous, the gay man 
has been harmed. Fricker explains that this harm is a testimonial injustice: the 
testimony of the gay man belonging to the social kind of gay is disregarded, even 
though his epistemic position may in fact be better. “When someone suffers a 
testimonial injustice, they are degraded qua knower, and they are symbolically 
degraded qua human. In all cases of testimonial injustice, what the person suffers 
from is not simply the epistemic wrong in itself, but also the meaning of being 
treated like that” (44)—if I suffer testimonial injustice it is degrading insofar as 
someone claims that she knows my existence better than I do.  
The third harm I identify is when members of the same social kind as the 
speaker deny the speaker’s testimony and at the same time cause the speaker to 
doubt her own place in the community she rightfully belongs to. Sometimes the 
doubts expressed about a given testimony can in fact appear so assured that the 
speaker begins to self-doubt. Suppose, to return to the above example, that when 
the gay man denies that gays are promiscuous, others take notice and correct him. 
Some of these denials might even come from other gays: sex just isn’t that big a 
deal. By itself, “sex just isn’t that big of a deal” is not an injustice, but when stated 
as the generic belief of the gay community by certain members of the gay 
community so as to correct those who dissent and show them that they are in error 
for thinking contrariwise, the statement denies the gays in opposition a sense of 
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legitimately belonging to the gay community. This particular kind of harm is 
deeper than the kind mentioned by Fricker. Fricker goes into a lot of detail about 
how people can deny a speaker the right to give a good testimony about external 
things. The harm I am identifying, however, is internalized in the speaker—maybe 
these other people do know my existence and experience better than I do; maybe I 
am wrong about what I know because of who I am. Depending on what kind of 
community the speaker identifies herself with, the harm might be greatly 
magnified. Telling someone they don’t belong to a book club, when they rightfully 
do, might not do that much damage, but, as Fricker points out, there are certain 
parts to our identity—“racial, political, sexual, religious” (53)—that matter more. 
This kind of injustice is expressed through generics because it picks out “authentic” 
traits that the speaker may not identify with. The implicit point is, then, that the 
speaker is only a member on a technicality. This harm is serious, as people are 
denied membership into the very community in which they rightfully belong.  
 1.4 The Gay Generic 
Like other generics, gay generics are constructed by either essential 
properties or foreboding traits. Sometimes, depending on the language community 
in question, the folk definition for being gay might be made up of both. I will argue 
that essential generics about gays are most likely due to limited interaction or 
exposure to gays. In this way, essential gay generics are unlike other essential 
generics—tigers are striped, dogs have tails, or birds fly—because they do not map 
onto the majority of things the generic represents. Because of this limited exposure, 
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gay essential generics only represent the traits that the speaker has been exposed to. 
Some essential gay generics are that gays are artsy, gays are fashionable, or that 
gays are sassy. In some ways, then, these essential gay generics do help people pick 
out who is gay in society. Essential gay generics help us pick out who is gay 
accurately in the sense of “here is the criteria for what gays are like”. This criteria 
is not just used by straights to identify others who are gay, but sometimes by gays 
to identify not only other gays, but also to establish their own social identity as gay. 
Think, for a moment, about people who are coming out and want to now be socially 
identified as gay. They understand that the essential gay generic traits will help 
others identify them as what they want to be identified as. Contrariwise, people that 
want to stay in the closet, for whatever reason, also are aware of these essential gay 
generics and avoid the behaviors that would pick them out as gay. Closeted gay 
men might not talk about theater or control control syllabant “s’s”, while closeted 
lesbians might refrain from talking about sports or wearing flannel.  
 The second reason I suggested that the generic conceptions of gay people 
hold so tightly to identity is due to fear. I mean two different things by “fear”: (1) a 
resistance to a strong challenge to traditional and comfortable assumptions about 
social, sexual, and gendered ordering and (2) a more extreme form manifest in the 
legal defense, “homosexual panic”. The first sense of fear seems pretty straight 
forward: socialization gives very few incentives to be gay. From a very young age 
children are told in explicit and implicit ways to be straight. Social, moral, and 
familial expectations bear down at every turn to have a “normal straight life.” In 
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seeing gays in parades, movies, and other public social roles as not only living an 
alternative lifestyle, but reveling in it, the assumption that the expectation, of a 
straight life as the only life, is severely challenged. I do not think that most straight 
people find this garish display liberating, and it is perhaps one of the root causes for 
animosity towards gays. Questioners of long held norms are rarely thanked for their 
inquiry. 
The legal defense of a “homosexual panic” is explained by Eve Sedgwick in 
her classic work Epistemology of the Closet. “The homosexual panic defense 
performs a double act of minoritizing taxonomy: there is, it asserts, one distinct 
minority of gay people, and a second minority, equally distinguishable from the 
population at large, of ‘latent homosexuals’” (20). Sedgwick goes on to say that 
these “latent homosexuals” are so insecure about their heterosexuality—because 
they are secretly gay and cannot bear to admit it—that when confronted with the 
prospect of a same sex sexual encounter, they may respond with any amount of 
force to neutralize the perceived threat. The gay person suffers the retaliation 
because he can recognize the “inner homosexual” in the straight person; if left 
unchecked, the gay person’s advance means to the heterosexual that he must really 
in fact be gay, a fact he cannot cope with and so must destroy or silence the 
evidence suggesting it. This legal defense, as noted by Sedgwick, is by far a 
minority position; nevertheless, it demonstrates the depths to which anxiety can be 
roused. 
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The result of these essential generics is that we have a folk definition of 
what it means to be gay. It is important to note that this folk definition is somewhat 
context sensitive. This folk defintion is not binding nor is it absolute; if somebody 
met a gay person who was none of the above traits, she would not say that he is not 
gay, but rather does not fit into the generic conception of being gay. The current 
conception of what it means to be gay is roughly a disjunctive definition. 
(GenG) → (P W  F…) 
 
G= Gay 
P=Promiscuous 
W=Witty 
F=Fashionable 
As the conditional definition stands, someone is gay if they have one or more of the 
stereotypical traits. At first this definition seems pretty plausible, straightforward, 
and commonsensical. But if we look closely, this is not actually a definition; it 
simply picks out category traits that help identify who is gay. Additionally, all the 
disjuncts are empirical, which means they are synthetic matters of fact and are open 
to change; they are not analytically necessary in terms of defining what it means to 
be gay. Furthermore, to be a promiscuous gay man already means that someone is 
gay prior to being promiscuous, so the generic conception of gay identity can help 
us identify gays, but it does little to define what being gay means. The generic 
conception falls apart as a definition when we pare away not only the lion’s share 
of the disjuncts, but all of them. We might say that no disjunct in particular is 
necessary for the entire statement to be true, but the statement cannot be true if 
none of the consequential disjuncts are present.  
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 What, though, do we make of the generic “gays are promiscuous”? How 
does promiscuity, a generic, differ from the definition I proposed at the beginning 
of this work—to be gay is to sexually desire someone only of the same sex? For 
starters, promiscuity picks out what is perceived to be a key part of gay identity: 
sex. Not only are gays promiscuous, but they are also probably kinky or into weird 
sexual practices. But why does sexuality or sex figure so largely into gay identity? I 
believe that we link the desire of wanting to be sexually involved with members of 
the same sex as a necessary, or close to a necessary, link to actually having sex 
with them. One reason may not necessarily be because of gay identity, but rather 
because of how sex is socially conceived. It is encouraged, if not expected, in 
popular culture for teenagers to be sexually active; if not by the end of high school, 
then by the end of college. There may be significantly different expectations for 
men and women—men are supposed to have had multiple partners, while women 
are supposed to have had only a few or none at all. Because homosexuality is often 
discovered or experimented with in these developmental years, sex is, along with 
raging hormones, at the forefront. But is this coupling of act with desire justified? 
 Are gay virgins like unicorns—logical possibilities, but something most 
will never see? The phrase has no element of contradiction, but it does seem to be 
odd, or at the very least, curious. This curiosity, I believe, is largely due to the 
generic that gays are promiscuous: not only have gays had sex, but they’ve had lots 
of it, or so the story goes. As an interesting anecdote, I was once at a party in grad 
school where everyone was gay and a bunch of us were standing in a circle just 
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talking. Suddenly, one of the people suggested we play “Tops or Bottoms,” which 
was a game where we had to guess if the person was either sexually a top or a 
bottom. I was stunned; I didn’t really know what to say: I had never really 
discussed my sex life with what were basically perfect strangers. When it finally 
came to my turn, I still didn’t know what to say, but apparently they didn’t either. 
The group was split on what position I actually was. I find this anecdote relevant 
here, because the game never even considered that I could have been a virgin. The 
concept of being gay was already tied to have been sexually active. Yet sexual 
activity is not required for being gay; I can know my desires without ever acting on 
them. Thus, the gay virgin contrasts nicely with the generic that “gays are 
promiscuous” because it is exactly this contrast that reveals promiscuity, or sex 
itself, to be a generic aspect of gay identity.  
 What happens when generic conceptions about group identity conflict 
with what is actually the case? Fricker talks about this social dissonance somewhat 
in her discussion on prejudices concerning social groups. She describes such 
prejudicial conceptualizing of a group as “a widely held disparaging association 
between a social group and one or more attributes, where this association 
embodies a generalization that displays some (typically epistemically culpable) 
resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment” (35). 
So even though a generic account of group identity for gays may come into conflict 
for people outside the social kind in question, the generic account persists. For 
example, suppose a woman has the belief that gays are sassy. She works with a gay 
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man who is actually rather dull but she befriends him solely on the expectation that 
he will be her “gay best friend.” Despite this lackluster friendship, she still holds 
onto the belief that gays are sassy. The individual’s identity is marginalized to 
maintain a prejudicial stereotype of the group.  
 What then, makes generics about sharks different from generics about 
gays? For starters gays are people who can be hurt by generic stereotypes in a 
variety of ways: physically, emotionally, economically, politically, etc. Sharks, by 
and large, aren’t really hurt by the generic “sharks attack bathers”; few, if any, 
people actively have vendettas with sharks because of the generic. Equally so, the 
generic inspires fear in swimmers, so the reaction is to swim away from the shark, 
not to swim out to it and fight. We might not hold anyone morally responsible for 
the generic, however untrue it may be, that “sharks attack bathers,” but we might 
with the generic “gays are promiscuous.” A key point of responsibility is that the 
person holding the negative view of gay people might not have had enough 
experiences with gays to be justified in holding that position, because that position 
has significant ramifications. We might not hold someone responsible if the belief 
was something innocuous, like people on the East Coast say soda instead of pop—
not much hinges on this belief. But even if it were the case that someone’s limited 
exposure to the generic dilutes responsibility for retaining the generic, we are 
arguing a pragmatic position rather than a rational conviction: the negative generic 
about sharks can be countered by reading articles on sharks, or going to aquariums 
or zoos, or even by watching nature shows.  
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 To counter the negative stereotypes of gays, a person might try to go out 
and meet more gay people. But this adventure is problematic from the start, and for 
at least two reasons: (1) many sites commonly associated with the gay community 
are bars, pride parades, and bathhouses which would likely reinforce the generic or 
the stereotype. There are many locations that would likely refute the generic, a gay 
bookstore, or B&B, but if the seeker is aware of gay culture only insofar as the 
generics informed him, he will have a hard time breaking out of this conception. (2) 
Gays do not have an easily identifiable marker. Many gays can blend in or stay in 
the closet and thus avoid detection by the seeker. Skin color, language, or even 
dress do not guarantee that a new gay person can be identified. A fundamental and 
pragmatic use of language is to find an easy way to identify people or groups. 
Being pragmatic in our concerns does not mean that we are being un-philosophical, 
but rather that we are looking to the effects of the generic as a sort of sub rosa 
advice: beware of sharks, they attack. Beware of gays, they corrupt. 
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2 History and Origins of Authenticity  
 Where did the foreboding generics about gays come from? Foucault, in 
the first volume of The History of Sexuality, documents and explains how these 
generic traits were associated with historically associated with homosexuality. The 
importance of the transition between the identity of the sodomite and of the 
homosexual was that the new social category, “homosexual”, inherited and 
invented foreboding traits to identify what it was. Briefly, the identity of the 
sodomite was one of action while the identity of the homosexual was one of desire. 
Sodomites were people who engaged in or had engaged in sodomy, while 
homosexuals did not require an expressive sex act to be counted as part of the 
social kind. The move from focusing on acts to focusing on desires has 
foundations, Foucault shows, in the Christian Pastoral tradition of the confession. 
The confession reframed the concern, in the context of sexuality, from “what did 
you do” to “what did you want to do.” Already this desire speaks to a deeper 
dimension of the human makeup because actions can only identify a person if the 
opportunity was present (Foucault 18-25). The desire shows a more “direct” view 
to who or what a person is because the desire for an action fundamentally means 
not only looking for opportunity where the action can be done, but also it shows a 
desire to make opportunities where none may have existed before.  
 How else did desire differentiate the homosexual from the sodomite? For 
starters “sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing 
more than the juridical subject of them” (Foucault 43).The sodomite existed only 
  
37 
 
insofar as he stood in contradiction to the law. His identity was, therefore, 
somewhat flat insofar as his one-dimensional existence was only understood in 
jurisprudence.
10
 Though rooted in the concept of the sodomite, the “homosexual 
became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a 
type of life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a 
mysterious physiology” (43). We find the difference between the two categories in 
the internal identity of the homosexual, which came about only with the 
convergence of other discourses outside of law. Psychology was needed to explain 
the new desire, economics was needed to explain the inability to increase 
population, medicine was needed to explain the gender inversion, and psychiatry 
was needed to explain a potential cure (Foucault 36-41). The sodomite had none of 
these discourses to open new contours to his identity, and more intriguing about the 
homosexual was that the very act which condemned the sodomite to the asylum, 
the jail, or the confessional never had to occur with the homosexual. The 
condemnation was diffused, “it was consubstantial with him, less a habitual sin 
than as a singular nature” (Foucault 43). The fact that the identity of homosexuality 
began with desire, and not a sex act, signified to Foucault that some particularly 
profound transformation was underway when all of the discourses converged: “the 
sodomite had been an aberration; the homosexual was now a species” (43). 
 Though the homosexual was something entirely new historiographically, 
there nevertheless were other sexual identities it was in company with. Foucault 
                                               
10 Imagine any identity being represented only in terms of legal documents. We would know very 
little about any identity aside from a few basic facts, residency, possessions, place of work, etc.  
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calls this catalogue of sexualities, “peripheral sexualities” and he lists them as: “the 
sexuality of children, mad men and women, and criminals; the sensuality of those 
who did not like the opposite sex; reveries, obsessions, petty manias, or great 
transports of rage” (38-9). These identities were more than simply unconventional, 
they were unnatural. We return to the distinction between desire and action as 
Foucault informs us that these peripheral sexualities were unnatural ways to be 
which correspond with the list of unnatural ways to act. “To marry a close relative 
or practice sodomy, to seduce a nun or engage in sadism, to deceive one’s wife or 
violate cadavers, became things that were essentially different” (39); the difference 
Foucault is talking about here is that this understanding of unnatural behavior is 
precisely an unnatural identity. Behavior, in this category, presupposed a desire and 
an intention to perform the unnatural identity. Anyone could partake in an 
unnatural act under the influence of drugs, but to desire the act, to make it into an 
identity, suggested a deeper interior and psychological motive that was inseparable 
from the very person in question. Foucault provides a list of unnatural acts and 
unnatural identities: the enumeration of unnatural acts is essentially different from 
the peripheral sexualities insofar as one is an action and the other an identity, yet 
the two are coupled together in this list: why?  
 Foucault described the point of divergence between acts and identity—
between sodomite and homosexual—as there being an interior and complex 
element in the peripheral sexualities that is noticeably lacking in the docket of 
unnatural actions. But the two are linked in terms of how they were understood at 
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the time: the peripheral sexualities were, no doubt, something more complex, but 
they share a close enough resemblance to the unnatural actions so as to retain the 
stigma from the actions. Foucault talks of two different registries keeping track of 
the different classes: “there emerged a world of perversion which partook of that of 
legal or moral infraction, yet was not simply a variety of the latter” (40). This new 
world was the world of the peripheral sexualities, “an entire sub-race race was 
born, different—despite certain kinship ties—from the libertines of the past” 
(Foucault 40). The rebellious identity that so characterized the sodomite stayed 
with the new sexually peripheral identities: fundamentally, each new peripheral 
identity was a challenge to the old order, “the procreative couple” which “laid 
down the law. The couple imposed itself as model, enforced the norm, safeguarded 
the truth, and reserved the right to speak while retaining the principle of secrecy.” 
In the beginning, “a single locus of sexuality was acknowledged in social space” 
(3).  
 Society, motivated by the various discourses, called each new identity 
forward to probe, catalogue, and analyze it (39). The procreative model could not 
help but be challenged, for here were the challengers being called forward from the 
periphery to the center, if only to testify and genuflect. “From the end of the 
eighteenth century to our own, they circulated through the pores of society; they 
were always hounded, but not always by laws; were often locked up, but not 
always in prisons; were sick perhaps, but scandalous, dangerous victims, prey to a 
strange evil that also bore the name of vice and sometimes a crime” (40). The 
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homosexual’s identity, even after the Victorian paradigm, unavoidably challenged 
various social, political, and medical norms. Those professionals and authorities 
that were charged with coming up with an identity for homosexuality were thus 
between the old and established identity of the sodomite and the new, not yet fully 
defined, identity of the homosexual. Occupying this nexus, the professionals 
constructed an identity out of the social conditions, attitudes, and beliefs of their 
time period. Considering the backdrop of the sodomite, can we really say the 
homosexual was an entirely clean break with past conceptions? Did these social 
authorities simply develop an entirely new thing? Yes and no. No in the sense that, 
as Foucault notes, the homosexual “species” arose from the “aberration” of the 
sodomite (43), but yes in the sense that the homosexual was defined entirely be 
desire and not by action. But where did these official or authoritative definitions 
come from? Were they simply incubated in an isolated environment of academics 
or other intellectuals?  
 Ian Hacking, in his article, “Making Up People,” argues that the social 
identities people imagine themselves to have are not immutable but rather 
contingent throughout time. Identities are constructed by society for people. 
Hacking’s point is that the social identities we construct have certain characteristics 
and once a person adopts or manifests those given characteristics, we consider her a 
member of that class. His position seems pretty straightforward, but his argument is 
subtle; society constructs identities and defines the characteristics so it can control, 
protect, and organize itself. We may want to say that how society talks about 
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people and what people really are, are two different things, but this objection 
misses Hacking’s main purpose. Society defines how a given class of people is 
supposed to be and when the definition gains traction through institutions more and 
more people begin to fall into that given class. Hacking does not say that all parts 
of an identity are immutable: the biological make up of individuals, for instance, is 
relatively fixed, but this immutability is not Hacking’s concern. The social norms 
give people constructed expectations to meet; people become these identities based 
largely on the social constructions and expectations, all of which are contingent.  
 A good example to illustrate how people are defined from above—by 
institutions, experts, and professionals—is how society first introduced, and then 
accepted, multiple personality disorder.  
A few psychiatrists began to diagnose multiple personality. It was rather 
sensational.  More and more unhappy people started manifesting these 
symptoms. At first they had the symptoms they were expected to have, but 
then they became more and more bizarre. First, a person had two or three 
personalities. Within a decade the mean number was 17. This fed back into 
the diagnoses, and became part of the standard set of symptoms. It became 
part of the therapy to elicit more and more alters. Psychiatrists cast around 
for causes, and created a primitive, easily understood pseudo-Freudian 
etiology of early sexual abuse, coupled with repressed memories. Knowing 
this was the cause, the patients obligingly retrieved the memories. More 
than that, this became a way to be a person. 
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The interesting twist that Hacking’s example provides is that the identity was not 
just created from above, by medical institutions and doctors, but also from below, 
by the very people who identified as suffering from multiple personality disorder. 
How could it be otherwise? The doctors may fish for more symptoms, but it is only 
the patients who can provide. The resulting dialectical dynamic is that the identity 
of “multiple personality disorder” is created from both above and below.  
 Hacking does not fully address the question of whether identities are 
ultimately constructed from above or below. Perhaps this question is too 
complicated to be addressed fully. He does provide an example, however, of how 
homosexuality was constructed by psychiatric discourse, how homosexuals were 
placed in institutions, and then how homosexuals were able to reverse the very 
rules against them. The medical world branded homosexuality as a disorder but 
“gay pride and its predecessors restored to homosexuals a control of the 
classifications into which they fall.” Hacking’s observation then is that when we 
have these new social identities, it is hard to say that authorities are defining them 
solely in terms of professionalism. Insofar as professionals live in a given social 
context, their definitions will reflect the attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs of that 
social context. Thus, when the various discourses described homosexuality in the 
1800s, they did so with the ordinary language of the time. Insofar as logical 
generics are embedded in ordinary language, they influence how professionals 
develop these authoritative definitions. But aside from making the largely 
uninteresting point that legislators, doctors, religious leaders, etc, all speak from 
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their given time frame, what I do think is interesting is what happens when we leap 
from ordinary language users who use generics and folk definitions to professionals 
who, by their very use of the words, transform the folk definition into an actual 
definition in an authoritative position. Once the language users adopt the generic in 
their respective field, the folk definition ceases to be a folk definition and becomes 
an actual definition, or is perceived to be an actual definition.  
2.1 New Natural Law 
The formulation of gay identity in philosophy of law, specifically New 
Natural Law, is a good case study of how folk definitions gain authoritative 
currency. John Finnis, one of the chief architects of the New Natural Law 
movement, characterizes homosexual sex acts as intrinsically wrong. Yet this 
definition of homosexual sexual immorality comes from being defined off of what 
heterosexual sexual morality is.  Finnis, in “Law, Morality, and ‘Sexual 
Orientation,’” argues that “parenthood and children and family are the intrinsic 
fulfillment of [marital sexual union]” (1065). Procreative marital sex is intrinsically 
good because “the union of the reproductive organs of husband and wife really 
unites them biologically…reproduction is one function and so, in respect of that 
function, the spouses are indeed one reality” (1066). Moral sex is not simply an 
expression of passion or lust, but requires a deep dedication to each other in a 
formal or public commitment. The public nature of this commitment signals to the 
rest of the community that this model of deep emotional investment is something 
worth striving for. The reproductive aspect of procreative marital sex is 
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intrinsically good because the dedication the couple has to each other is no longer 
bound in a “personal reality” (1066); it is literally embodied in the next generation 
(1068). It is the continuity of this dedication that is ipso facto morally good (1070-
71) because it ensures the survival of the community. Finnis’ argument is that we 
cannot separate these goods into individually intrinsic goods; they go hand in hand 
with each other. So a series of one night stands that produces children is not 
intrinsically good because the parents lack dedication to each other. A couple who 
is emotionally invested in each other, but does not want kids and in fact goes out of 
their way to make sure that their sex is not-procreative, is missing the point of sex. 
Sex is not for individuals to feel good in the throes of passion or even feel long 
term desirability; rather, sex is a commitment to each other beyond the present 
moment.  
After defining and defending moral sexual conduct for heterosexuals, Finnis 
moves to defining why homosexual sex acts are intrinsically immoral. Homosexual 
acts cannot, by biological facts, reproduce; they can only pretend authentic sexual 
heterosexual love. Homosexuals mimic sexual love because they can only engage 
in alleged mutual devotion to one another (1069). This devotion is alleged precisely 
because it does not entail procreation. If the purpose of sex is to biologically unite 
people through children and emotionally unite them in mutual devotion to each 
other and the raising child, then homosexual sex by definition cannot be genuine 
devotion. Finnis is not saying that people in gay relationships cannot sacrifice for 
each other, but rather that affection homosexuals feel for one another is tied to the 
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present and cannot secure the future of the community. This inability is tied to 
biological facts rather than emotional inability. An important point to note here is 
that Finnis is not saying that because a majority of homosexual sexual encounters 
occur in a back alley or are the product of a one night stand all homosexual sex acts 
are wrong. As far as I know, Finnis gives very few figures to support his claim. 
This evidentiary absence is not because he is lazy or is afraid that empirical 
evidence would count against him, but rather that homosexual sex is wrong by 
definition. Finding examples of “moral” sexual acts between homosexuals would 
simply be, for Finnis, finding people who are good pretenders.  
Stephen Macedo, in “Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind,” criticizes 
how New Natural Lawyers have defined and used homosexuality identity. Macedo, 
confused by “the frequency with which conservatives translate their opposition to 
promiscuity and liberationism into blanket condemnations of homosexual conduct 
is as puzzling as it is illegitimate” (264), attempts to use the very definitions New 
Natural Law uses against itself to argue that not all homosexual sex acts are 
intrinsically immoral. If the doctrine of New Natural Law picks out a social 
category by a false way of knowing about that social category, then, Macedo 
reasons, the rules built up upon that dubious category seem to collapse. But are the 
New Natural Lawyers really unaware of non-promiscuous gays? I don’t think so, 
nor are they stopping their ears by ignoring obvious examples. Instead, the 
immorality of being gay is built into the definition of being gay. Immorality is not a 
consequence, but an expression of identity.  
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I believe that Macedo’s objection to New Natural Law identifies that the 
definition New Natural Lawyers are using is based on a logical generic conception 
of gay identity, specifically a generic definition that identifies gays as promiscuous 
or otherwise sexually unfit. Macedo rightly points out that New Natural Law 
frames the ethical constraints on universal character traits, but the belief that gays 
are intrinsically promiscuous is simply false—all that is needed is one counter 
example—yet the belief remains.  
[Finnis] refers off-handedly to ‘the modern ‘gay’ ideology,’ which treats 
‘sexual capacities, organs and acts as instruments to be put to whatever suits 
the purposes of the individual ‘selves’ who have them’. Millions of 
homosexual live are thus presumptively epitomized by a promiscuous 
liberationist ‘gay lifestyle,’ which rejects all sexual restraints and value 
judgments. These sweeping generalizations are, however, 
overgeneralizations. Not all gay people are promiscuous (284). 
Macedo believes, therefore, that New Natural Law identifies gays by the generic 
“gays are promiscuous”. Macedo points to the fact that a minority of gays are 
promiscuous and that the entire category should not be defined by a few 
individuals. On Macedo’s characterization of New Natural Law, New Natural 
Lawyers out what they deem to be a salient trait of homosexual identity: 
promiscuity. 
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The definition that Finnis uses acts as an intellectual touchstone for other 
conservative conceptions of being gay. Macedo argues that as a matter of facts, this 
characterization is false. So where does it come from? We might be tempted to say 
that conservatives just have a limited exposure to gay people, and that may be true, 
but I think there is something deeper going on. The generic of promiscuity, among 
other deviant traits, is a challenge that homosexuality represents to the established 
social and gendered order. While this challenge may inspire some kind of fear or 
anxiety, it is also believed to be essential to being gay. Attributing deviance to 
homosexuality is seen in how gay rights are argued: it is not the promiscuous gays 
that are denied marriage, but all gays. It is not just the infected gays that cannot 
donate blood, but all sexually active gays. Not just high risk gay sex is not taught in 
public school health curriculum, but sexual education about any kind of gay sex. 
The outline of logical generics above in no ways defends the generic that 
“gays are promiscuous” should be the case. In fact Macedo is right to point out that 
most gays are not promiscuous (264 & 272), yet Macedo believes New Natural 
Lawyers do seem to take their ethical cues from the generic that “gays are 
promiscuous”. Despite his observation, I do not think Macedo is productive in 
getting New Natural Lawyers to abandon their belief because he does not 
understand what kind of belief it really is. To be fair, Macedo is not totally unaware 
that promiscuity is a conservative stereotype, but he wrongly assesses its function: 
“Perhaps sensing the weakness of their moral arguments, conservatives fall back on 
stereotypes depicting all homosexuals as promiscuous, uncommitted, and 
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irresponsible. Such overgeneralizations may provide psychological comfort, but no 
reasoned support…conservative moralists tar an entire class of people…for the 
behavior of only some in this class” (293). While Macedo is approaching the use 
stereotypes or generics, he believes they are a fallback position, not the starting 
point. In labeling the generic as simply psychological comfort, Macedo 
misdiagnoses the conservative position and goes about trying to treat a disease that 
is not there. It is easy to dismiss New Natural Lawyers of engaging in a bigoted 
propaganda campaign, but to do so misses out on a chance for to actually dialogue 
or enact change. New Natural Lawyers, far from being unaware of non-
promiscuous or virgin gays, are using a generic of gay identity as if it were the 
definition. In short, they are defining an identity from a position of authority.  
Finnis himself, again in “Law, Morality, and ‘Sexual Orientation’”, 
characterizes gay sex:  
In reality, whatever the generous hopes and dreams and thoughts of giving 
with which some same-sex partners may surround their ‘sexual’ acts, those 
acts cannot express or do more than is expressed or done if two strangers 
engage in such activity to give each other pleasure, or a prostitute pleasures 
a client to give him pleasure in return for money, or (say) a man 
masturbates to give himself pleasure and a fantasy of more human 
relationships after a grueling day on the assembly line (1067). 
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Finnis does not qualify that anonymous gay sexual acts are immoral, or that for the 
most part gay sexual acts are immoral, but gay sex is immoral, full stop. Finnis is 
not saying as a generic, “gay sex is immoral”, but rather as a definition, “all gay 
sex immoral”. So he, and others in the New Natural Law movement are making a 
fallacy of composition. I suspect that, like Hacking’s point, these philosophers have 
grown up hearing and using certain generics about homosexuals long before they 
adopted the more refined lexicon of New Natural Law. These generics, I believe, 
heavily influenced the formation of how these ethical positions were developed. 
Even if we assume that New Natural Law inherits the discussions of sexuality from 
Augustine and Aquinas, Hacking’s point still stands. Mark Jordan, for instance, 
documents in The Invention of Sodomy how sexual attitudes were discussed, 
argued, and above all invented, in early Christian theology. Perhaps the New 
Natural Lawyers can tap into some objective language and create their rich 
vocabulary of sexual ethics, but it is far more likely that this position and codex of 
beliefs arose through gradual and historical developments. By employing generics 
in the context of New Natural Law, philosophers take the generic and transform it, 
by their very position, into something that is accepted no longer as a folk definition, 
but as an actual definition. Once we accept that employment, the ethical positions 
of the New Natural Lawyers hold. The qualitative leap from generic to authoritative 
definition is perhaps the most important to discuss and challenge.  
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3 Issues of Authenticity 
 Authentic definitions are composed of generic statements about objects. 
Unlike folk definitions, however, authentic definitions build a kind of coercive or 
normative force into the definition. Authentic definitions hold that real x’s have a 
trait y; x’s that do not have y may still count as an x, but in some technical or 
disingenuous way. Counterfeit money, for instance, is still money, but the qualifier 
“counterfeit” signals that the money is worthless and not really money. In some 
cases, we use logical generics to construct definitions for social groups so that we 
give a model for members to be aware of what other members in the group are 
aiming at or striving to become. “Real men take responsibility”, for instance, tries 
to impose a norm on the biological population of males. Men that shirk 
responsibility or do not accept the consequences of their actions—deadbeat dads or 
adult Peter Pans—are seen as somehow deficient by society or other language 
users. Authentic definitions, for better or worse, denigrate members who do not 
meet the traits deemed to be “authentic”. Contrariwise folk definitions tend to treat 
members without the relevant generic trait as curiosities, rather than defective. 
 There are two kinds of authentic definitions: imposed authenticity and 
designed authenticity. Imposed authentic definitions are part of an essentialist 
conception of a community. Outsiders look at a community and assign traits that 
stand out and then define membership in that community on whether members 
have the traits or not. Usually, this generic conception remains fixed or static. 
Edward Said famously argues this position in his magisterial work Orientalism. 
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Europeans investigated the Middle East or South Asia and collected a set of traits 
that described the Orient—both people and geography. Orientalism fixed the 
people and the land as an underdeveloped and ignorant mass. The Orient existed as 
essentially pre-modern and mystical. Violent and unrefined, the Orient required 
Western scholarship, politics, and social norms to understand and define what it 
was—not just for the Europeans, but for the population of the Orient itself. Said’s 
criticisms set off shockwaves within Postcolonial discourse and it is hard to find 
contemporary work in the discipline unaffected by his ideas. While Postcolonial 
studies may be one of the most diverse and diffuse areas of academic discourse, a 
major unifying theme is the deconstruction of these Oriental myths and stereotypes. 
Postcolonial studies is designed to give a voice to those who were spoken for. 
Said’s observation, then, identified authentic traits in order to expel them.  
 Designed authentic traits are cultivated from within a society. Max Weber 
argues in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism that Protestantism took 
thrift, industry, and hard work to be the traits of real Christians. These traits were 
not imposed on the Protestant community by Catholics or other religious groups to 
call the Protestants cheap, but rather were consciously adopted and internalized by 
the Protestant community itself. Protestants believed that such traits would reveal 
hints of God’s favor: commercial success might indicate that Protestants were 
predestined for heaven. Weber pinpoints that it was this overwhelming concern 
about the afterlife that spurred Protestant anxiety to constantly work: financial 
success was only a hint that God favored those who worked hard, it was not a 
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guarantee. To continue to assuage their anxiety, Protestants had to keep working 
while emphasizing the above mentioned virtues so that they could continue to see 
the next suggestion of God’s favor. Thus, the Protestant work ethic was a 
temporary solution to the permanent problem of Protestant anxiety. The constant 
focus on resolving the question of who was predetermined by God caused the 
Protestant community to perpetuate the traits of industry, competition, innovation, 
and thrift onto future generations. Lazy or apathetic Protestants were scorned as not 
really Christian because they did not earn financial success and thus not being 
favored by God.  
3.1 Warner  
 Despite the fact that gay generics and folk definitions were imposed, 
Queer Theorists have actually internalized some of the imposed foreboding 
generics as a kind of designed authenticity. Queer Theorists attempt to parlay the 
way traits that traditionally disadvantaged homosexuality into advantageous 
criticisms of social and moral values. History shows that the pejorative generics or 
stereotypes were forced onto gay identity. Gay identity became synonymous with 
these traits largely because gays were unable to resist: dismissed as mentally 
incompetent or muted by imprisonment, gays had no real agency to form their own 
identity. Now, when the asylum no longer binds and the jail no longer sequesters, it 
would seem almost natural for gays to purge the traits that society had branded onto 
them. Yet, curiously enough, this kind of self-exorcism has not happened. 
Philosophers like Michael Warner or Leo Bersani attempt to reverse the stigmas 
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associated with the linguistic markers of being gay. While segments of the gay 
community do their best to draw a cordon sanitaire between the demonized 
members and the rest of the gay community, Warner rightly points out that gays are 
perceived as a whole community; sub-communities are merged into one mass.  
Pride or stigma belongs to us as a class, a recognizable kind of person, 
regardless of our deeds as individuals. Thus there always seem to be some 
gay people who are shocked, shocked to find that others are having deviant 
sex. They will have you know that their dignity is founded on being gay, 
which in their view has nothing to do with sex. If others are having sex—or 
too much sex or sex that is too deviant—then those people have every 
reason to be ashamed (31) 
Hypersexual activity is not, according to Warner, something to be ashamed of 
because it reflects honesty about sexual identity. Warner posits a kind of false 
moral innocence in self-constructed gay images that try to decouple deviant sex 
from a more mundane gay lifestyle. The radical honesty and embrace of that 
honesty is what motivates Queer politics. Only when we reflect on and open up 
about what we really want as individuals, can we have a more inclusive and 
tolerant society. Such social honesty is, for Warner, the mark of progress. 
 Warner’s observation is that the perceived group of gays has an almost 
irresistible binding power: the most deviant will stand on the same level of 
consideration as the most assimilated. Yet it is this binding power that leads to a 
sort of paradox. The two extremes belong to the same group, yet seem worlds apart. 
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Warner explains that the distance between the two breeds contempt rather than any 
kind of ecumenical exchange. 
On top of having ordinary sexual shame, and on top of having shame for 
being gay, the dignified homosexual also feels ashamed of every Queer who 
flaunts his sex and his faggotry, making the dignified homosexual’s stigma 
all the more justifiable in the eyes of straights. On top of that he feels shame 
about this own shame, the futileness of which he is powerless to redress. 
What’s a poor homosexual to do? Pin it on the fuckers who deserve it: sex 
addicts, bodybuilders in Chelsea or West Hollywood, circuit boys, flaming 
queens, dildo dykes, people with HIV, anyone who magnetizes the stigma 
you can’t shake (32). 
Warner’s project, to be clear, is on the role of sex in relationship, not just the sex 
act, but how sex is performed in everyday actions. Wearing clothes that accentuate 
certain parts of the body, going to clubs that advertise certain behaviors, or even 
giving language to desires that would otherwise remain silent all contribute to a site 
of tension. Warner’s point is that straight society cannot separate the two poles of 
“dignified homosexual” from “libertine homosexual”; the dignified homosexual 
turns on the libertine because the latter is unavoidably dragging down or 
besmirching the dignified attempts to pass as normal. The dignified homosexual 
may come across as polished and refined to a straight society, but the existence of 
this other group proves that the dignified homosexual could in fact partake in their 
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bacchic culture under the cover of night or a long weekend. In short, the dignified 
homosexual can never escape the libertine’s stigma.  
 Warner is not just concerned about sexual identities, but also about how 
gays actually have sex. Warner makes clear that a Queer project is to undermine the 
taboo nature sex has taken on in polite society. Instead of strict regulation making 
sex dignified, Warner argues that it is that very regulation which is destroying sex 
by prohibiting it. A common accusation against libertine gay culture or Queer 
culture is that it does not appreciate the intimate power of sexual union between 
two committed people—a one night stand is simply immature sexual wanderlust. 
Yet Warner strongly rebuffs this accusation: “The most fleeting sexual encounter 
is, in its way, intimate. And in the way many gay men and lesbians live, quite 
casual sexual relations can develop into powerful and enduring friendships. 
Friendships, in turn, can cross into sexual relations and back. Because gay social 
life is not as ritualized and institutionalizes as straight life, each relation is an 
adventure in nearly uncharted territory” (115). The intimacy of temporary sexual 
commitment is in the ability of each participant to lay down what he or she wants 
out of their time together.  In stipulating a limited or extended level of intimacy in 
these relationships, Queers are able to tailor relationships to individual needs and 
not preconceived social models. Each individual sex act holds the potential to be a 
site of Queer resistance to societal norms. 
3.2 Bersani  
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Another Queer theorist, Leo Bersani, argues along similar lines to Warner: 
the contentious site of sexual morality and practice is not a site of punishment for 
homosexuals, but rather an opportunity to expand ethical considerations and 
practices. Bersani offers a more critical assessment of how gays ought to adopt a 
sexual ethics or what practices could even be ethical. In his work Homos, Bersani 
argues against Foucault’s idea that Sadomasochism provides a new horizon for 
sexual practice, a way to liberate homosexual sex from heterosexual paradigms (77-
112). Bersani summarizes Foucault’s argument: “S/M, he is suggesting—partly due 
to the frequent reversibility of roles, partly as a result of the demonstration S/M is 
said to provide of the power to the bottoms, or presumed slaves—has helped to 
empower a position traditionally associated with female sexuality” (82). Bersani’s 
conclusion, however, is that while S/M does present a new way to structure power 
in sexual relationships, it is, at bottom, a reordering of power, not a new power 
source. “Revolt allows for new agents to fill the slots of master and slave, but it 
does not necessarily include a new imaging of how to structure human relations. 
Structures of oppression outlive agents of oppressions” (174). Even though the 
roles of master and slave can be recast in every encounter, the roles nevertheless 
remain. Thus, by allowing the dominate or passive role to be played by either 
partner, all S&M does is free up the power structure; it does not replace or 
undermine it. 
In a later work, Is the Rectum a Grave? Bersani offers a way to begin 
creating a new source for power in sexual relationships that erodes the paradigm he 
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assigns to heterosexuality. Bersani’s proposal for how gay sex can offer a new way 
forward in terms of how we practice and conceptualize sex is not about the act 
itself, but rather the conditions in which we imagine the act to occur. Bersani 
himself says: “in Homos, I expressed my skepticism about the viability of S&M—a 
practice constitutively committed, it seems to me, to the idolatry of power—for 
such major relational shifts. In cruising, I’m proposing another sexual model…one 
in which a deliberate avoidance of relationships might be crucial in intimacy, or at 
least clearing the ground for, a new relationality” (59). Cruising, the anonymous 
engagement with strangers for sex, offers a way forward because it enables people 
to wipe away barriers of sexual, emotional, and psychological shyness. Cruising is 
not about regulating which actions occur in sex, but rather about how we practice 
sex at all. “Cruising, like sociability, can be a training in impersonal intimacy. The 
particularity that distinguishes it for sociability is, of course, that it brings bodies 
together…in cruising—at least in ideal cruising—we leave ourselves behind” (60), 
and in doing so, we are able to move closer to the person we are with, an exercise 
in self-awareness and desire. Bersani’s argument comes down to the idea that 
promiscuity in gay sex is a good thing, and instead of being something to be 
ashamed of, it should be something that is celebrated because it offers personal 
development for those who practice it and may guide those who do not. 
3.3  Authentic Identity 
 So what does this sexual challenge look like, if it is not just about who has 
sex and how sex happens? Recall that the Queer challenge is not just in the sex act, 
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but also in how sexuality is performed. A direct way people perform their sexuality 
is in their identity and their relationship to another person. Warner gives a brief cast 
of characters in the Queer community: “between tricks and lovers and exes and 
friends and fuckbuddies and bar friends and bar friends’ tricks and tricks’ bar 
friends and gal pals and companions ‘in the life,’ Queers have an astonishing range 
of intimacies. Most have no labels. Most receive no public recognition. Many of 
these relations are difficult because the rules have to be invented as we go along” 
(116). These identities are not just discrete sexual acts or relationships; they serve 
as a site of linguistic and political resistance. Linguistically speaking, Warner 
makes the point that “the impoverished vocabulary of straight culture tells us that 
people should be either husbands and wives or (nonsexual) friends. Marriage marks 
that line. It is not the way many Queers live. If there is such a thing as a gay way of 
life, it consists in these relations, a welter of intimacies outside the framework of 
professional and institutions and ordinary social obligations” (116). The absence of 
“straight culture,” and presumably “straight language” to classify these 
relationships allows Warner to articulate a Queer theme: Queers are not defined and 
can be creative and innovative in ways to challenge the social order. Note also the 
phrase “gay way of life”—what is Warner doing with this phrase? He is spelling 
out the way in which gays ought to live, the ways and stopping points gays should 
have in their journey of being “fully gay”. Thus, a definition based on authenticity 
is established as the  normative definition.  
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 The point of this challenge is to increase societal legitimacy and acceptance 
to all different kinds of identities and practices. If people are different and have 
different desires and practices that are not hurting anyone else, why should people 
conform to preconceived templates of relationships? Individuals know better than 
others in regards to what they want, so why not allow individuals to pursue their 
relationships on their own terms? The implicit next question is, of course, how do 
we recognize this new network of relationships? This new network of relationships 
is not merely a linguistic challenge, but, as Warner points out, a political challenge 
to marriage and a “straight way of life”. Insofar as these relationships challenge the 
political order, they are outside of the political order—they are not recognized by 
the legal, let alone social, structures of society. By not remaining monogamous, by 
being sexually on-again-off-again with people, by staying in touch with one night 
stands, Queers challenge the cultural and political supports for the marital model. 
The inability of “straight culture” to name these relationships means that “straight 
politics” cannot invest any power in these relationships.  
In trying to create a language to document these relationships and bring 
them into legitimate discourse, Warner’s project inherently meets resistance from 
the older language. Non-Queer language users will question what benefits this new 
language will have? What practical value will it advance? What other changes will 
have to be made to accommodate this new language and these new terms? 
Language, to be sure, is not simply an innocent combination of words, but a 
representation of a variety of other factors. Fundamentally, language does not just 
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demarcate what is talked about and how it is talked about, but also what is worth 
talking about. How words gain entrance into language and how those words are 
used can be an explosive site of contention. A contributing factor to the American 
Civil War was how “property” and “person” were defined. The entire debate of gay 
marriage comes down to how the word “marriage” is defined. The debate over 
abortion hinges precisely on when something counts as a “person”. In fighting for a 
language that is equipped to talk about these new relationships, Warner is not just 
arguing for a new nomenclature, he is arguing for a new way of talking about, 
imagining, and structuring society. Thus, the project of language, how we call or 
name something, is not just intimately tied to politics, how we value something, 
because as Warner shows, language is politics.  
The structure of language as a political tool shows how an “authentic” gay 
acts as the definition for what it means to be gay. To pursue his goal of getting the 
above mentioned identities in language, Warner most pose that these identities are 
precisely what language is supposed to talk about. If there is such a thing as a 
Queer language or culture, surely, Warner reasons, these identities and their 
corresponding names form the basic building blocks. Insofar as there are gays who 
do not participate in these Queer identities, Warner can charge those gays of being 
inauthentic. So how does one become an authentic gay? How is someone 
technically gay? Warner argues that it was the debate of marriage that separated the 
real gays—the Queers—from technical gays—the gays who would rather be 
straight according to Warner. The pursuit of marriage, as opposed to disestablishing 
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marriage or opening marriage up to a variety of experimental models is precisely 
the reason why gays were no longer cutting edge—gays were moving to the 
suburbs and were no longer interested in going to rallies, but were now interested in 
making sure dinner was ready for their boyfriend. The real “gays” were no longer 
gays, but were the Queers. Being gay became normal.  
 To be clear, it was not the desire to be normal that seemingly disqualifies 
gays from their revolutionary past, but rather their success. A fundamental point of 
being Queer is to challenge the very idea of what is accepted and what is the norm. 
Insofar as gay marriage menaced traditional family values and imposed the very 
question of what counted as a legitimate family construction to society, gay 
marriage was a Queer trait. What detached gay marriage from the Queer agenda 
was its success; because to engage with the marital model means some kind of 
assimilation must occur. So long as gays were outside the marital realm, their 
challenge was precisely that, a challenge. The moment gay marriage became 
another model for marriage was the moment that gays stopped being a challenge to 
the system they were resisting exactly for the reason that they were now a part of 
the system that had hitherto excluded them. To be sure, gays are nowhere near total 
societal inclusion, but the very fact that court cases have been decided in favor of 
gay rights, gays are allowed to live in the suburbs, and are allowed to be open in 
places of employment means that assimilation is occurring. The barbarians stopped 
fighting Rome when they were counted as Romans.  
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 This assimilation is the most heated battleground for Warner because it 
signals nothing else then an about face of what was once a Queer vanguard. Gays 
had a kind of political history and force behind them; they had rioted, 
demonstrated, marched, and became a social and political force to be taken 
seriously. Other peripheral sexualities were not, and are not, nearly as well 
organized. S&M conventions lack serious lobbying groups and practitioners of 
bestiality have no significant war chest or organization to put said war chest use—
in short, the political cost of losing gay organization was tremendous to the Queer 
movement. With gays becoming normalized in the legal battle for marriage, Queer 
politics have had much of the wind taken out of its sails; Queers were the ones who 
kept on pushing for more social change and societal openness to new models of 
morality and sexual practice precisely for the reason that they were not yet 
legitimate. This Queer pursuit of social change does not make such a clubbed claim 
that gays are totally normal, but rather that gays, for Warner, lack a certain kind of 
political appeal and are gay mostly in a technical sense, but not in a robust or 
exemplar status.  
 One of Warner’s criticisms of the gay movement is that in the 1990s 
concerns of gay rights quickly became the concerns of the white gay community. A 
number of factors converged explaining this event, but largely the gay community 
became fractured by race, class, and location. The white suburban gays dominated 
the discussion for what rights were sought for by the rest of the gay community. 
Black gays, urban gays, Latino gays, and numerous other interests of the gay 
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community were muted in the pursuit of marriage and other rights that Warner 
assigns to the white suburban demographic.
11
 We might take his observation as a 
genuine criticism so as to widen our moral and political awareness, but I think 
Warner’s accusation of white suburban gays stealing the show is more politically 
motivated than he would let on.  
3.4 Authentic v. Analytic 
 But what does it mean to say that someone is not really gay? Is Warner’s 
normative account an entirely different project than my analytic account? To say 
that someone is “really gay” or “Queer” for Warner means they adopt a certain set 
of social or political attitudes or beliefs. In short, a community identity is projected. 
The description of authentic gay identity attempts to pose as a definition so it can 
have normative force; the “authentic definition” tries to coerce individuals to 
change their behavior to match up with the projected identity. To be a real gay, a 
man must do x, if he does not, he may be gay in some technical or boring sense, but 
not in a substantive or interesting sense. This exclusion is something like a 
linguistic sleight of hand—it smuggles in certain political or social expectations 
into the definition. Thus, the normative account is not a different project because it 
tries to coerce individuals into its definitional scope. Accounts of authentic 
individuals fall apart with the phrase: “not really an x”. Something is either an x or 
                                               
11 Warner’s criticism might be true, white suburban gays quit the political struggle when things 
started going well for them, but does this criticism equate to identifying treason en masse? An 
interesting question would be whether or not Warner would be willing to follow his criticism 
further: Jewish gays are often underrepresented, so are South Asian or Southeast Asian gays—why 
does he not include their voices in the tally of what the white suburban enclave eclipsed? What 
about gays of whatever ethnicity? They are often unmentioned in gay or Queer discourse, yet 
Warner is oddly silent about their absence.  
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it is not. When the phrase “not really an x,” is used as an actual definition, it is 
never quite adequately explained. 
 Additionally, even Bersani criticizes Warner for his Queer language and 
identity because it seems to misidentify people excluded from, the term “Queer”. 
“The anti-identarian politics of Queer theory risked erasing the specificity of 
homosexual desire by defining as ‘Queer’ that which resists the regime of the 
normal. This criterion, while accepting a large number of heterosexuals as Queer, 
implicitly denied that privilege to quite a few gays and lesbians” (Grave 66). 
Bersani’s point is that gays still have a long way to go in the normalization process: 
perhaps they have sold out, but they still are held in a sideways glance by straight 
society or, at the very least, treated as a model that is not (yet?) “normal”. Another 
concern is that if challenging a social order is what it means to be “Queer” than 
perhaps the net is cast too wide; any group or person who does not fit in with a 
given community is Queer. Blacks living in suburbia, Jews in the American South, 
Catholics in Northern Ireland would all be statistically Queer. By this logic, would 
conservative Queers, if such a term could exist, be the Queerest Queers because 
they challenge the movement from within the movement? Admittedly, the pint I am 
trying to make has a lot of moving parts. Queers are people who challenge social 
norms. By and large, the group that Warner is trying to identify is more or less the 
drag queens, the sexually promiscuous, the people who live a gritty lifestyle. But 
what about someone who is a drag queen, but also a devout Southern Baptist? 
Certainly this person fits the social model of Queer—he is challenging the social 
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norm in a way that Warner applauds, but what about his religious belief? Warner 
spends a lot of time in The Trouble With Normal criticizing religious moralizing as 
he calls it. Would the cross dressing Southern Baptist be too Queer or not Queer 
enough? Without linguistic rigor limiting the discussion, Warner’s terminology 
runs the risk of applying to too many things to provide much headway in any kind 
of political or social reformation.  
 Linguistically, authentic membership is a vague concept; politically, it is 
not. Mary Bernstein documents in her article “Celebration and Suppression: The 
Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement,” which appeared in 
The American Journal of Sociology, the explicit ways gay and lesbian communities 
argued for what amounted to an authentic definition of what it meant to be gay or 
lesbian in terms of politics. She cites the practical value of the “strategic identity 
deployment,” as it allows members of the community to know what other 
members, or the community on the whole, should be striving for (530-36). The 
function of a strategic identity is that “some sort of identity is necessary to translate 
individual to group interests and individual to collective action. All social 
movements require such a ‘political consciousness’ to create and mobilize a 
constituency” (536). Strategic identity is an authentic identity because it is the 
projection of what a member of the group in question should be doing or should 
look like. No doubt there is a huge pragmatic benefit in having this projection 
because it gives members a goal or model to look at. Additionally so, the model 
helps cement group cohesion because there is a recognized standard that members 
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know what other members are fixating on. Members who do not aim at achieving 
this strategic identity might be seen as uncommitted to the group, a free-rider, or a 
“bad member”.  
 While acknowledging the benefits of any strategic or authentic identity, 
there are several questions that need to be asked. For starters, who is projecting or 
defining this strategy? What goals are trying to be achieved and why? Who got to, 
and how did the group, decide on these goals? Not all of these goals are outwardly 
political—political insofar as they are trying to change policy. Some goals, 
Bernstein notes, are political insofar as they try to shape or mold the group identity 
in question: “Identity can also be a goal of collective action (identity as goal). 
Activists may challenge stigmatized identities, seek recognition for new identities 
or deconstruct restrictive social categories” (536-37). This formation of identity is 
not universal and may be localized to certain subgroups of a larger group. Bernstein 
points out how various gay and lesbian communities constructed different 
“strategic identities” for elections depending on the different regional, 
demographic, social, and political factors where the election would take place. 
Thus, the strategic identity of New York gays fighting for rights was much more 
pluralistic in terms of race, ethnicity, cultural background, social class, etc. while 
the gay rights movement in Oregon was much more homogenous in almost all 
factors. In both cases, a strategic identity was presented, not just to the gay 
community, but also as an ambassador of sorts to the straight community. The 
strategic identity summarized the demands, concerns, and politics that each 
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community sought (544-49). Thus, strategic identities acted as a way to know the 
community that they are trying to represent and a way to be known by those not in 
the community.
12
  
 Bernstein, though she does not have him in mind, seems to be describing 
Warner’s project pretty accurately. To be sure, Warner is not some social strategic 
general, pouring over maps and charts plotting how to advance armies of arguments 
here or what literary strongholds need to be defended. But there is a politic in 
Warner’s work and he is not really subtle about it. Warner’s project is to reject 
preconceived notions about what things are: there are no “normal” people, but only 
perceptions, and false ones at that, about what being “normal” is. The Queer 
movement aims at keeping the rest of society honest, as it were, and tries to not 
only open up social spaces for people who are different, but to also allow them 
social conceptual space so as to experiment and give license to creativity and 
originality. The message, at bottom, is do not be who you are supposed to be, be 
who you are. Yet Warner’s project seems somewhat odd, insofar as it overlooks 
that maybe people, and an apparently large number, simply do want to be normal, 
not in a robust or interesting sense, but just want to be somewhat innocuous in their 
                                               
12 Bernstein also raises the possibility that sometimes these strategic identities will downplay the 
differences between communities. In the gay rights struggle in Vermont, for instance, she points out 
that while “Vermont had a strong lesbian-feminist community with developed organizational and 
personal networks, it had not targeted the state about specifically lesbian or gay issues. Motivated by 
the religious right’s attack on lesbian and gay rights, activists decided to work for passage of a 
statewide bill that would protect lesbians and gay men from discrimination” (549). The strategic gay 
and lesbian identity in Vermont, therefore, looked radically different from the strategic identity in 
Oregon or New York insofar as the strategic identity did not want to come across as “gay” or 
“lesbian” but rather as an innocuous citizen.  
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lifestyles. Hence, his charge of gay treason against a Queer community compels a 
question as to whether or not Queers are rejecting or replacing any given paradigm. 
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4 Definition and Defense  
 The definition I am proposing for “homosexual” is “to sexually desire 
someone only of the same sex”. On the face of this definition, I must first say that I 
am making a distinction between lesbians and gays. For my purposes here, lesbians 
are female homosexuals while gays are male homosexuals. I see no reason why 
“lesbian” could not also have the same definition. So, better phrased, someone is 
gay if he is a male and he sexually desires only males. Someone is a lesbian if she 
is a female and desires sexually only females. So we have a definition, now what? 
How do we tell how is lesbian and who is gay? To answer this question, we must 
first answer a more basic question: who is male? Who is female? I am not really 
concerned with defining “male” or “female”, so whatever definition we want to put 
forward is fine.  
 How is an analytic account of identity any different from an authentic 
account or a folk definition? Folk definitions lack a desire and ability to pick out all 
members. Additionally, folk definitions are dependent on a person or language 
community’s experience to gain currency. The result is that several generics may 
have currency in discourse, but not actually define what a thing is—generics may 
only define what a thing appears to be. Authentic accounts of identity are grounded 
in what people inside or outside the community in question want the population to 
be, not what it actually is. Additionally, any authentic account must presuppose an 
analytic account. In making the move from analytic to authentic definition, 
language users build more into a definition than is sustainable by the facts.   
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 In terms of gay identity, authentic definitions or folk definitions 
foreground traits that are not always useful to increase political, social, or economic 
agency. Describing gays as promiscuous may put them in a unique social position 
to challenge sexual mores or social rules, but the opportunity cost is particularly 
high. One example is that in embracing this position, conservatives and many 
others have pointed out that gays, by their own admittance, are not fit for 
marriage—an institution that demands monogamy and fidelity. However hallow 
this criticism might or conception of marriage might be, it is nevertheless an 
argument that is genuinely believed to be true. Cheshire Calhoun notes in 
Feminism, Family, and the Politics of the Closet that marriage is not about the 
acquisition of rights, but of legitimacy. To be gay is not to be denied rights within a 
society, but to be denied even entrance to that society as a legitimate member. 
 Folk definitions also pose a kind of image problem to gay agency. Not 
quite as strong as authentic definitions, folk definitions list traits that are deemed 
essential to being gay. The implicit message is that if you want to be counted or 
recognized as gay, these are the traits that you should adopt. The “should” is a 
prudential should; it marks the most convenient way for members to be known. 
Insofar as these folk definitions or logical generics are based on experience, and not 
on argumentation, there is a difficult puzzle of trying to alter these conceptions by 
providing enough experiences to language users so that the generics of gays being 
fashionable, sassy, or artsy are true only relative to a certain sub-group of the 
overall population. One part of the puzzle is that not all members are known: the 
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closet provides a kind of barrier to being able to know who counts as gay. We 
cannot, then, simply say that all gay people should come out of the closet to get a 
full head count. Not only is this suggestion wildly implausible, but also dangerous 
depending on certain social conditions gays or lesbians find themselves in.  
 How do we alter the problems folk definitions pose? As a point of 
honesty, I should say up front that some people’s conceptions will not change. 
Quine’s notion of conservatism of belief describes this resistance quite well. People 
may have held a belief for a very long time and also may have linked it with other 
very important religious, social, or political beliefs. Some people, while being open 
to changing their folk definitions, might also have some kind of reluctance, if only 
from force of habit. Some people might be young enough or open minded enough 
to let change happen quickly. I imagine that most of us, in terms of retaining our 
folk definitions, fall into the group of people who are open, but somewhat resistant, 
to change. So how do we provide these experiences? We already ruled out the 
coming out en masse and I imagine that trying to corral a kind of gay ambassador 
program where gays go out to different communities to raise goodwill is equally 
implausible. The best way, I believe, to combat the negative aspects of the folk 
definitions is to offer counter or alternative models to the folk definitions of gay 
identity. To be most effective, these models should be present in popular and 
familiar culture and media. Gay and lesbian characters in sitcoms, shows, movies, 
and stories are all good ways to build characters that are relatable to people while 
still offering an example that challenges the generic conception. Shows like 
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Dawson’s Creek, Modern Family, Glee, Happy Endings, Desperate Housewives, 
Shameless, Golden Girls, Friends, Will & Grace, Seinfeld, Rosanne, The Simpsons, 
Rescue Me, and many others depict gays in a somewhat different light than the folk 
definitions at the time conceived of what it meant to be gay. The result was that 
new generics were developed into the false definition and more and more models 
for gay and lesbian identity were recognizable.  
 Another way to challenge the negative aspects of the folk definition is for 
high profile celebrities or public figures to come out while still challenging folk 
definitions. Ellen DeGeneres is a good example. Prior to Ellen coming out, a 
common generic was that lesbians were butch, wore flannel, and played softball. 
Ellen was none of these, in fact she was so mainstream that J.C. Penny’s, a clothing 
company, selected her as their spokeswoman. What is interesting about J.C. 
Penny’s selection was that an action group, One Million Moms, posted several 
complaints about J.C Penny’s selection. One Million Moms protested that Ellen 
was an inappropriate choice because she would expose children and families to a 
gay agenda in a shopping area that was supposed to be politic free. The public’s 
response was overwhelmingly in favor of Ellen and supporting J.C. Penny’s 
decision to hire her. Even conservative pundit Bill O’Reilly came to her defense. 
His decision was not out of dedication to LGBT rights per se, but rather out of an 
urge to defend “The essential question is that a conservative group in this country is 
asking a private company to fire an American citizen based upon her lifestyle. I 
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don’t think that’s correct”.13 O’Reilly’s support for Ellen was particularly 
surprising, especially because two years prior, he had gotten into a very public spat 
with Rosie O’Donnell, an open lesbian T.V. show host.14 So what was the 
difference between O’Donnell and Ellen? To be clear, the nature of the both 
women’s relationship with O’Reilly was somewhat different: O’Donnell openly 
criticized O’Reilly while, as far as I know, Ellen had little conflict with him. One 
other point of difference, and I think this point is particularly interesting, was that 
O’Donnell was very butch and embodied a generic conception of what a lesbian 
was. Ellen, however, publicized a much more low-key lesbian identity that 
challenged the generic of being lesbian by being socially innocuous. Aside from 
staring on a TV show where she tells jokes and dances, she really wouldn’t stand 
out in a crowd. One moral we might take from this story is that the more socially 
neutral an identity is, the more likely it is not going to be challenged. In some 
cases, it may even be defended by people who would, and have, taken positions 
against it in the past.  
 Generics are far too important to how ordinary language functions to 
prose getting rid of them. The most realistic way we could apply an analytic 
account of being gay to ordinary language is to offer so many alternative models 
for what it means to be gay so that the only common factor uniting them is the 
same-sex desire. As a point of expediency, the more “normal” or close to what is 
socially common, the more effective we will be in eliminating the negative aspects 
                                               
13 http://popwatch.ew.com/2012/02/08/bill-oreilly-ellen-degeneres/. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/08/ellen-degeneres-one-million-moms-jc-pennyl 
14 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t5im6Fc_478 
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of generics. To be sure, no one model will provide a breakthrough moment for re-
conceptualizing gay identity, but every bit helps. The more relatable gays and 
lesbians are to the rest of the public, the less stigmatizing and magnetizing the 
generics will become. The upshot of diluting the logical generics is that ordinary 
language conceptions of being gay will become more neutral, as the definition “to 
sexually desire someone of the same sex” provides no grounds for the treating the 
generics or the authentic definitions as actual definitions. With this neutral 
conception as a starting ground, social and political policies are less likely to be 
discriminatory. Insofar as politicians, doctors, religious leaders, or other authorities 
draw their conceptions of what it means to be gay from ordinary language, we can 
only benefit from a more neutral account of what it means to be gay.  
 Why sexual desire? Why not simply say what we’re all thinking? 
Someone is gay if he has sex with other men. Someone is lesbian if she has sex 
with other women. Foucault’s analysis of how homosexuals differed from 
sodomites suggests that this definition will not work, but suppose his point is 
purely historical and we want to use the term “homosexual” or “gay” or “lesbian” 
now in the way that “sodomite” was used. I do not believe that this proposal will 
really be that useful. For starters, several teenagers would identify and be 
recognized as gay or lesbian, yet never have had sex. What about men who are 
raped by other men? Are both men gay, neither, or just the one who initiated? What 
about gays or lesbians who have taken a vow of celibacy? Additionally, how many 
times must one have sex to be counted as gay or lesbian? Do past encounters count 
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or does membership in this identity require renewal? These are just some of the 
problems with defining gay or lesbian identity on a purely sexual account.  
 So why desire over acting on the desire? Isn’t action a kind of proof 
positive for the desire? Sexual desire works better than sex as a definition because 
it includes the people that we would intuitively count as gay or lesbian (virgins) 
while excluding instances where we would not intuitively count participants as 
gays or lesbians (rapes). To be clear, sexual desire does not mean simply 
recognizing someone of the same sex as attractive. People tell each other all the 
time that someone looks attractive, cute, or nice without any kind of sexual 
motivation for making the comment. So what do I mean by “sexual desire”? Sexual 
desire is a desire or affection that is sexually motivated. It necessarily contains an 
erotic element to it. At its base, it is purely sexual attraction to a member of the 
same sex. But what is sexual attraction? Is it simply physical or lusting? Does it 
require an emotional or psychological connection with another person? Countless 
people desire anonymous sex or one night stands with people of the same sex and 
have no intention of building any kind of emotional relationship beyond that. 
Clearly “sexual” does not require any kind of emotional commitment.   
4.1 Conclusion 
 Here is, I believe, the definitional bedrock: to be gay is to be sexually 
attracted to someone of the same sex. Whether sexual desire should be unbridled or 
not is a different question for a different day. What I would like to say, however, 
before closing, is that yes, the folk definitions and generics are unfair to gays and 
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lesbians: a few loud and overt people and acts have defined how an entire kind of 
people is thought of. Yet those are the facts on the ground and to wish they were 
not so is simply not productive. So if we are to have a discussion about gay rights, 
we must first begin with how gays are thought of, however inaccurate, by society. 
Gays may not be afforded the same sexual liberties that straights are, but that is, for 
the moment, simply a linguistic and generic fact. In and of itself, this linguistic fact 
is neither good nor bad, but tells us how our actions will be perceived. Because of 
the folk definition, a gay person does not always have the luxury of being treated as 
a new person, sometimes he may be compared to, and incorporated into, another 
language user’s folk definition of gay people. The benefit and point of my 
argument here is that gays and lesbians are not committed, in virtue of their being 
gay or lesbian, to any political or moral project. In absconding from this political 
commitment, gay and lesbian identity becomes a neutral identity. The accusations 
hurled at gays and lesbians by opponents no longer have rational ground to stand 
on. With this thin definition, there is no longer room or rationale for an adequate 
prohibition on gay political agency. By denying a fundamentally political identity, 
gays enable political agency. 
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